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I. INTRODUCTION

For democracy and the rule of law to function and flourish,
important actors in the justice system need sufficient independence
from politicians in power to act under rule of law rather than political
pressure. The court system must offer a place where government action
can be reviewed, challenged, and, when necessary, limited to protect
constitutional and legal bounds, safeguard internationally-recognized
human rights, and prevent departures from a fair and impartial system
of law enforcement and dispute resolution. Courts also should offer a
place where government officials can be held accountable. People
within and outside a country need faith that court decisions will be
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made fairly and under law. Because the Council of Europe’s Group of
States against Corruption (“GRECO”) deems judicial independence
critical to fighting corruption, GRECO makes a detailed analysis of
their members’ judicial system part of their member review process.1
This Article is a case study of the performance of Poland’s mechanisms
for judicial independence and accountability since 2015, a time of
extreme political stress in that country. Readers will see parallels to
comparable historical and current events around the world.
Similar concerns arise regarding independence of other parts of
the legal community from political control: lawyers (meaning a legal
profession that can represent and advocate for clients including in
matters versus the state), 2 prosecutors, and the law faculties and
professors who educate legal professionals. 3 For all these legal actors,
1. The Council of Europe established GRECO in 1999 to monitor the forty-nine member
states’ compliance with the organization’s anti-corruption standard. Membership comprises
forty-eight European countries and the United States. What is Greco?, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/about-greco/what-is-greco [https://perma.cc/CG2D-K6GR]
(last visited Oct. 10, 2018); see infra notes 74-135 and accompanying text for discussion of
GRECO’s recent conclusions and concerns about Poland.
2. For historical reasons Poland has two separate bars of practicing lawyers: legal advisors
and advocates. Izabela Kraśnicka, Polish Legal Education in the Light of the Recent Higher
Education Reform, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 691, 701-03 (2012) (explaining the five Polish
apprenticeship tracks as well as similarities and differences between the legal advisor and
advocate professions). On September 18, 2018, the Polish legal advisors’ profession changed
their name to attorney-at-law, see OIRPWARSZAWA, https://www.oirpwarszawa.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/uchwa%C5%82a-102_2018-KRRP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9WJS93Y5] (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). Concerning the differences between the US single legal
profession system and the system of multiple professions in European countries, see Laurel S.
Terry, An Introduction to the European Community’s Legal Ethics Code—Part 1: An Analysis
of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10-11 (1993); infra notes 13 & 14 and
accompanying text.
3. The Mount Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence (“Mount Scopus
Standards”) are an effort by a global group of academics and judges to formulate judicial
independence standards applicable across legal and governmental systems and applicable to
judges on both national and international tribunals. They seek to set minimum guarantees for the
independence that both individual judges and a system’s judiciary need while also articulating
appropriate mechanisms for democratic accountability of the judiciary. Although focused on
judicial independence, Article 9 of the Mount Scopus Standards recognizes the significant roles
that lawyers, legal education, bar associations, and education of the public play in assuring
appropriate judicial independence. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND WORLD PEACE, Mount Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence (Mar. 19,
2008), https://www.jiwp.org/mt-scopus-standards [https://perma.cc/H6GG-YQN9]; Shimon
Shetreet, Creating a Culture of Judicial Independence: The Practical Challenge and the
Conceptual and Constitutional Infrastructure, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 17, 22 (S. Shetreet & C. Forsyth
eds., 2012) (on the importance of an independent legal profession in creating an independent
judiciary in post-communist societies).
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individually and in the collective bodies they form, independence from
government control (at least meaning ruling political officials) is
justified by the important public functions that independence serves.
Unfettered professional independence, however, can cross a line to
guild protection, self-service, arrogance, and forgetting the societal
reasons for independence. Hence, the concern to balance independence
with accountability. 4
This Article offers a cautionary tale about how attempts by
political leaders to control the courts can be couched in accountability
terms, while in practice operating as instruments of political control.5
Governmental structure alone does not guarantee judicial
independence. 6 The legitimate functioning of governmental structures,
e.g., a National Judiciary Council, depend on a country’s culture and
the respect of its officials for often unwritten and unspoken bounds
separating the branches of government. 7
In US courts, separation of powers and checks and balances offer
one model for judicial independence, although federal and multiple
state courts vary in whether elected officials play a role in the selection
and retention of judges and prosecutors, as well as with regard to
matters such as court structure and budget. 8 With the interaction in state
and federal governments in the US federal system, one level of
government sometimes checks the other’s power, e.g., when state and
local government officials challenge federal actions. 9
4. DAVID KOSAŘ, PERILS OF JUDICIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES:
HOLDING THE LEAST ACCOUNTABLE BRANCH TO ACCOUNT 2 (2016) (describing the inevitable
clash of these two principles such that “[a]ll democratic countries . . . have to find the right
equilibrium” between them).
5. Id. at 7, 9, 13, 16, 57, 68 (terming abuses of accountability mechanisms “perversions”
of accountability); id., ch. 6, at 236-333 (discussing such abuses in Slovakia).
6. See generally id. (comparing the Czech experience with the Ministry of Justice model
of judicial independence and accountability with the Slovakian National Judiciary model).
7. See infra notes 17, 376-379, and 381 and accompanying text.
8. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FAQS: JUDGES IN THE UNITED
STATES (2014), available at http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/
judge_faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDS3-36RL]; see generally David J. Barron, Judicial
Independence and the State Court Funding Crisis, 100 KY. L.J. 755 (2011).
9. See generally, Claire McCusker, The Federalism Challenges of Impact Litigation by
State and Local Government Actors, 118 YALE L.J. 1557 (2009); Sadurski, Wojciech, How
Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding (63
Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 18/01, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3103491
[https://perma.cc/5V53-UKAU] (discussing the weakness of Polish institutions in withstanding
“anti-constitutional populist backsliding” and pointing out federalism as a “veto point” in
systems with that form of government).
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This Article considers the Polish case regarding the delicate
balance between judicial independence and accountability. Poland’s
judicial structure follows the National Judiciary Council model, one of
the two principal models for judicial governance that are common in
civil law countries with parliamentary governments. 10 A National
Judiciary Council with overall authority in judicial appointment,
retention, discipline, budget, and court management provides a
structure meant to secure the judiciary’s place as a separate, co-equal
branch of government.
The path to the judiciary and its relationship to the other legal
professionals in many civil law countries is quite different from that in
the United States. 11 Most civil law judges enter the judiciary track in a
national system immediately after completing their academic legal
education and remain there, perhaps advancing to be the president of a
court, to a higher court, or to a more desirable city. 12 This differs greatly
from the US system where the juris doctor (“JD”) and a state bar exam
are the usual single point of entry to all future careers in the law. 13 US
lawyers may take positions as prosecutors or judges at some point in
their legal careers and then move on to another type of job. 14 Lawyers
normally become judges only after a number of years practicing law,
whether in private practice, as in-house counsel, prosecution, another
government position, public defense, or a nongovernmental
organization. Many state and federal judges do not seek to move
beyond the bench to which they were appointed or elected. If a US
judge moves to a higher court, this usually is through an election or
10. KOSAŘ, supra note 4 at 131-35 (discussing five models of European court
administration with the Ministry of Justice model as the “longest-standing one” and the judicial
council model now common in Central and Eastern Europe).
11. Id. at 12, 118-19
12. In Poland, law graduates now usually enter this track through the Szkoła Sądownictwa
i Prokuratury (“SSIP”), the school for judges and prosecutors, which provides classroom
instruction combined with apprenticeship in the courts. Kraśnicka, supra note 2, at 704;
Fryderyk Zoll, The System of Judicial Appointment in Poland—A Question of the Legitimacy of
the Judicial Power, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 3, at 301, 30809.
13. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Lawyers, in OCCUPATIONAL
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, available at https://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/mobile/lawyers.htm
[https://perma.cc/J5N3-LRE6].
14. Professional Legal Ethics: A Comparative Perspective, CEELI CONCEPT PAPER
SERIES, 2-6 (2002), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/
roli/misc/professional_legal_ethics_con_paper.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VC3HNPM] (central difference in US legal profession from European ones of a unitary rather than
divided legal professions).
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appointment system in which judicial peers and superiors play little or
no role. 15 Unlike Poland and some other civil law systems, the US
practicing bar and public often have a significant role in judicial
selection and retention while fellow judges have little or no role. 16
Part II provides the reader background on the pre-2015 framework
for judicial independence in Poland, as well as the Authors’ critique of
it; the dramatic changes since 2015; and the pushback among Polish,
international, and European institutions to those changes.
Part III presents this Article’s thesis. In 1989, the Solidarity
Roundtable negotiators pressed for a system in which appointment,
performance assessment, court administration, promotion, discipline,
and indeed most aspects of a judge’s career and the judicial system,
would be self-governed by the judiciary through the National Judiciary
Council structure and general governance system for the courts. The
Solidarity negotiators’ design has provided some important defenses to
withstand the recent assaults on the Polish judiciary.
Part IV briefly identifies issues that Poland will face in undoing
the damage done since late 2015 and reviews modifications of the pre2015 judicial system that should be considered when calmer times
return. The conclusion reminds readers that Poland is not the only
nation whose judiciary faces political headwinds. Considering how
Poland’s institutions have (and have not) withstood political stress, and
the assistance that regional, international, and civil society
organizations have provided, as well as the limits of their influence, is
a useful case study for other countries as well. The Polish experience
also demonstrates how accountability mechanisms can become
weapons of destruction without widely accepted and shared cultural
norms on “judicial virtue,” the role of the judiciary versus other

15. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 8 (ways US state
and federal judges are selected, evaluated, and retained).
16. Id. at 4 (discussing state judicial selection where attorneys and laypersons serve along
with judges on commissions recommending judicial appointments to governors including those
in which lay members are the majority); 7-8 (how state judges are reappointed or retained); 910 (judicial performance evaluation systems for state judges including questionnaires to
attorneys, jurors, litigants, witnesses, and court staff, as well as other judges); 11-14 (path to the
bench and retention of federal judges); James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the
Organized Bar in State Judicial Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L.
REV. 683, 684-91 (2002).
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branches of government, and bounds, if crossed, that threaten
democracy and the rule of law. 17
Since this Article’s first presentation at the Fordham Stein
Center’s December 2017 international legal ethics conference, 18 the
European Union has become an increasingly important actor in the
struggles regarding judicial independence and accountability in
Poland. 19 Hence, it is fitting that this Article appears in the Fordham
International Law Journal issue focusing on EU law and
commemorating Professor Roger Goebel’s years of significant
contributions to the Journal. 20 This Article was updated on Polish
events and the European and international actors reacting to them
through January 30, 2019 and does not address subsequent events.
II. BACKGROUND
Section A provides a capsule history of Poland’s complex history
since the nation’s sovereignty was restored a century ago, focusing in
particular on how and why the Solidarity Roundtable process, when
negotiating the transition from communism, insisted on a strong form
of judicial independence. 21 Section B.1 considers actions of the
government since the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość party (the Law and
Justice party, commonly referred to by its Polish acronym PiS) returned
to power in 2015. PiS “reforms” of the judicial system have been multifront, complex, contentious, and in the forefront of much of the
international attention focused on Poland. When PiS came back to
power in 2015, their leaders understood that bringing the judicial
17. KOSAŘ¸ supra note 4, at 19, 428 (describing the importance of “accountability-as-avirtue,” including a “well-developed sense among academics, lawyers, and judges themselves
of how judges ought to behave, what it means to be a good judge”); infra note 381 (discussing
the guardrails of democracy).
18. Regulation of Legal and Judicial Services Conference, FORDHAM U. SCH. OF
L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/26666/regulation_of_legal_and_judicial_services_conferenc
e [https://perma.cc/M9L3-L8GY] (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
19. See infra notes 228-325 and accompanying text.
20. Deborah L. Rhode, International Legal Ethics: The Evolution of a Field, 42 FORDHAM
INTL. L. J. 218, 225 (2018) (reference to the Stein Center’s October 10-11, 1991 conference on
Internationalization of the Practice of Law and Professor Goebel’s book on international legal
practice co-authored with the then Stein Center Director Mary Daly). Attending the 1991
Fordham conference referenced in this Article sparked Co-Author Wortham’s interest in
international legal ethics.
21. For an excellent summary of Polish history, economics, and politics since the end of
Communist rule and the PiS party’s return to power in 2015, see Change of State, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 2018, at 43-45.
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system under political control was crucial to the success of their other
policy aims. 22 PiS’s philosophy and policy aims have been consistent
since the party’s founding. 23 Section B.2 reviews expressions of PiS’s
view that courts should not stand in the way of a popularly-elected
government, albeit one elected by a relatively modest portion of the
eligible electorate, 24 and a majority government’s view of the national
interest.
Section B.3 reviews the campaign that the PiS government has
waged against the Polish judiciary. Recent PiS statements talk about
judiciary reform in terms of increased accountability, responsiveness
to the public, reduced delay, greater efficiency, and so on. These,
however, are not the objectives of their dismantling of the existing
system. Rather than an effort to improve the judicial system’s
functioning, PiS initiatives are based in an ideological view that courts
should not stand in the way of a majoritarian will. 25 The PiS changes,
if fully implemented, will give the political branches effective control
of the courts.
Section C’s account of international, European, and civil society
concerns about Poland points out the substantive areas in which Polish
government has moved, e.g., treatment of nongovernmental
organizations, control of public media, loosening environmental
regulations, politicization of the civil service and military. Section D
reviews past proposals for improving the Polish judicial system and
discusses ways that the system’s functioning may have left Polish
judges and courts vulnerable to attack.
A. Polish Judicial Independence and Institutions in Historical Context
When Poland regained independence in 1918 after almost 125
years of partition, the country inherited five legal systems (Austrian,

22. See infra Part II.B.2.
23. Party History, PIS, http://pis.org.pl/partia/historia-partii [https://perma.cc/N2Z9SNR5] (last visited July 31, 2018).
24. Sadurski, supra note 9, at 2 (PiS received 37.5% of the vote with a turnout of 59.9%,
18% of those eligible to vote), 60 (15% of votes cast were “wasted” because they were cast for
parties that did not meet the 5% threshold for a party to be represented in the Polish parliament).
25. Cf. KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 82 (2009) (quoting
Hamilton’s Federalist 78 on the “counter-majoritarian function” of the courts, a “necessary
check on the people themselves” and a guard against “serious oppressions of the minor party in
the community”).
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Hungarian, German, Polish-French, and Russian). 26 At independence,
the court systems of the previous ruling empires (Austria-Hungary,
Russia, and Germany) were in place. 27 In the period until Polish
independence ended with the German invasion of Poland in 1939, the
country worked on developing a unification of law and the judicial
systems. 28 The May Coup of 1926 by Józef Piłsudski pushed the
fledgling republic toward a more authoritarian system, including
efforts for the state to control the judiciary. 29
During World War II, Germany annexed large parts of Polish
territory while the Soviet Union invaded other parts of the country. 30
People in those territories became subject to the German and Soviet
legal and judicial systems. 31 The remaining portion of the interwar
Polish nation was under Nazi control in the “General Gouvernement,”
although this area was not formally incorporated into the German
Reich. 32 In this General Gouvernement area, the Polish Supreme Court
was abolished, but lower Polish courts continued to function to some
degree regarding matters among Poles, though as a practical matter,
under the full control of the German authorities. 33
After World War II, a communist government took power in
Poland under significant Soviet influence. 34 In the period of Stalinist
26. ADAM ZAMOYSKI, POLAND: A HISTORY 307 (2009) (referring to four legal systems
without naming them, but this does not take into account the differing Austrian and Hungarian
roots of the legal system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which ruled part of the divided
Poland).
27. NORMAN DAVIES, GOD’S PLAYGROUND—A HISTORY OF POLAND: VOL. II 1795 TO
THE PRESENT 298 (revised ed. 2015) (three legal codes in place).
28. Adam Lityński, History of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland, THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND (June 6, 2018, 01:06 PM),
http://www.sn.pl/en/about/SitePages/History.aspx [https://perma.cc/25QF-DSBM] (discussing
the 1921 constitution based on the Montesquieu principle of three separate powers and the period
until the unification of the common courts in 1929).
29. Grzegorz Ławnikowicz, Sędziowie w autorytarnej Polsce [The Judges in
Authoritarian Poland], (31) 2 KWARTALNIK KRAJOWA RADA SĄDOWNICTWA 14 (2016), e.g.,
the following quote: “Teraz już w przypadku wszystkich sądów decyzja o tym, kto zostanie
sędzią i kto awansuje, należała do ministra.” [“From that point, the decision as to who should be
appointed a Judge, and who is to be promoted rested upon the minister”] (available in Polish,
translated by co-author Zoll).
30. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 315; DAVIES, supra note 27 at 324.
31. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 315.
32. Id. at 316-17.
33. JULIUSZ BARDACH, BOGUSŁAW LEŚNODORSKI, & MICHAŁ PIETRZAK, HISTORIA
USTROJU I PRAWA POLSKIEGO [THE HISTORY OF POLISH LAW AND POLITICAL SYSTEM] loc.
1546 – 48 (2009) (ebook).
34. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26 at 332-36.
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sway in Poland (1947-56), communist authorities almost completely
controlled the Polish government, of which the judiciary was an
integral part. 35 For example, the communist party ultimately directed
and ordered outcomes in criminal prosecutions. 36 Some space for
judicial independence opened in the post-Stalinist thaw beginning in
1956 and continued until the imposition of martial law in 1981.37
During this period, the mechanisms for state control persisted, but
communist authorities varied in their choice to exercise them. Some
Polish judges became experts in working within open spaces. 38 Under
martial law, the state reasserted political control of the judiciary in
seeking to control outcomes in political trials. Some judges and
prosecutors sought to go as far as they could in their positions to avoid
or mitigate this political influence while staying in their positions. 39
Many Polish judges, however, resigned in reaction, and some became
advocates (that being the Polish legal profession authorized to appear
in court representing criminal defendants). 40
In the 1980s, the unicameral Parliament of the communist
government (“the Sejm”) amended the Polish constitution to create
three institutions normally associated with democratic government and
the rule of law: the Superior Administrative Court (1980), which has
the authority to review administrative decisions; 41 a Constitutional

35. Id. at 346.
36. Id. at 351 (noting that during this period, “the criminal justice system was geared not
so much to delivering justice as to protecting the social, economic and political order”).
37. For references to the “thaw,” see ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 359; DAVIES, supra
note 27, at 437.
38. ADAM LITYŃSKI, HISTORIA PRAWA POLSKI LUDOWEJ [HISTORY OF THE LAW IN THE
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF POLAND] 44-45 (2010) (Communist leaders put pressure on judges in
some cases but the “majority of judges” had the ability to maintain independence but for a few
instances of “telephone justice” in Poland.). Telephone justice refers to informal influence or
pressure exerted on the judiciary, a common term referring to the way regimes deal with the
judiciary. See, e.g., Alena Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24 J. POST-SOVIET AFF. 324
(2008).
39. LITYŃSKI, supra note 38 at 45 (after introduction of martial law, one judge was
arrested, and others were detained, investigated, or subject to search of their apartment or
removed); ADAM STRZEMBOSZ & STANISŁAW ZAKROCZYMSKI, MIĘDZY PRAWEM I
SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCIĄ [BETWEEN LAW AND JUSTICE] 145 (2017 ) (on judges’ difficult decisions
whether to remain in their positions).
40. STRZEMBOSZ & ZAKROCZYMSKI, supra note 39, at 145 (large number of resignations
after martial law ended).
41. Artykuł 1 i 2 ustawy z dnia 31.01.1980 o Naczelnym Sądzie Administracyjnym oraz
o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego [Law on the Superior
Administrative Court], Dz. U. 1980 nr. 4 poz. 8 (Pol.).
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Tribunal (1982); 42 and an Ombudsman (1987). 43 The Sejm adopted
laws implementing the operation of the Constitutional Tribunal
(1985) 44 and Ombudsman (1987). 45 Although the government’s
intention may have been propaganda, the institutions rather quickly
began taking some actions to protect citizens’ rights.
With the practical collapse of the Polish economic system in the
late 1980s, communist rulers became open to sharing power (and
responsibility for the problem) with the Solidarity-based opposition.46
A negotiation process on sharing power commenced, and “the
Roundtable” process proceeded from February 6 until April 5, 1989.47
The future status and operation of the judiciary was an important
element of these negotiations. 48
The Roundtable process led to an election in June 1989 with free
voting for one-third of the Sejm, which was now the lower chamber of
a bicameral Parliament. 49 The remaining voting was restricted to
42. Ustawa z dnia 26.03.1982 o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej
[Law on the Amendment of the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic], Dz. U. 1982 nr.11
poz. 83 (Pol.).
43. Ustawa z dnia 15.07.1987 o Rzeczniku Praw Obywatelskich [Law on the
Ombudsman], Dz. U. 1987 nr. 21 poz. 123; DAVIES, supra note 27, at 500 (referring to
appointment of ombudsman and stating, “[b]ut there were no citizens’ rights worth speaking
of.”) (Pol.).
44. Ustawa o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym z 29 kwietnia 1985 [The April 25, 1985 Law on
the Constitutional Tribunal], Dz. U. 1985, poz. 98, g.ekspert.infor.pl/p/_
dane/akty_pdf/DZU/1985/22/98.pdf#zoom=90 [https://perma.cc/7DY8-FKQY] (Pol.).
45. Ustawa z 15 lipca 1987 o Rzeczniku Praw Obywatelskich [The July 15, 1987 Law on
the Ombudsman], Dz. U. 1987, poz. 123 (current version Dz. U. 2017, poz. 958),
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/ustawa-o-rzeczniku-praw-obywatelskich
[https://perma.cc/YFD9-7QHP] (Pol.).
46. Marek Dobrowolski, Ustrój państwa w porozumieniu Okrągłego Stołu [Poland’s
Political System in the Round Table Agreement], (92) 2 PRZEGLĄD SEJMOWY 77, 78-80 (2009);
JERZY LUKOWSKI & HUBERT ZAWADZKI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF POLAND 314, 316 (2d ed.
2006); DAVIES, supra note 27, at 493-94 (describing the deterioration of the Polish economy).
47. Brian Porter, The 1989 Polish Round Table Revisited: Making History, 6 J. INT’L INST
1 (1999), available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jii/4750978.0006.301?rgn=main;view=full
text [https://perma.cc/3YK4-MPBC]; Co-author Zoll’s father, Andrzej Zoll, was Solidarity’s
legal expert in the 1989 Roundtable negotiations as well as a Judge of the Constitutional Tribunal
(1989-1997), Tribunal President (1993-1997), and Polish Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights
(Polish Ombudsman) (2000-2006). Regarding the Roundtable process, see also DAVIES, supra
note 27, at 501-03; LUKOWSKI & ZAWADZKI, supra note 46, at 317; ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26
AT 381-82; TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE’S GHOSTS AFTER
COMMUNISM 232-36 (1995).
48. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 381-82 (Roundtable agreement “guaranteed . . . the
independence of the judiciary”).
49. Regarding the 1989 election, see ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 382, 384; DAVIES supra
note 27, at 504; LUKOWSKI & ZAWADZKI, supra note 46, at 317-18.
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selecting among names offered by the Communist party (Polska
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza) and two of its satellite parties,
Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe (Agrarian Party) and Stronnictwo
Demokratyczne (Democratic Party) in a formula such that the
communist party could not achieve an absolute majority. Because the
Solidarity-backed opposition overwhelmingly carried the “free” onethird voting, the Solidarity-based opposition was able to form a
coalition government with the Agrarian and the Democratic parties,
and take power from the communists.
The Roundtable agreement created the Polish Presidency. In one
of the Roundtable compromises, the Parliament elected communist
leader Wojciech Jaruzelski to the position. 50 Under the agreement,
control of the police, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and of the
military remained under communist party control. 51 Solidarity
negotiators insisted on a strong form of judicial independence as a
counterbalance to government control of the police and military. 52 In
practice, however, President Jaruzelski generally did not impede the
shaping of the government in to democratic form. 53
The newly-formed 1989 Parliament moved quickly in several
respects important to the judiciary including the addition of a
constitutional provision declaring that “the Polish Republic is a
democratic country observing the rule of law and implementing the
principles of social justice.” 54 Six new judges were elected to the thentwelve-member Constitutional Tribunal (“Tribunal”), which meant that
six pre-transition judges remained. The newly-constituted Tribunal

50. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 384.
51. DAVIES supra note 27, at 504; LUKOWSKI & ZAWADZKI, supra note 46, at 318;
ROSENBERG, supra note 47, at 238.
52. Krzysztof Grajewski, Postulat utworzenia rady do spraw sądownictwa podczas obrad
Okrągłego Stołu [A Proposal for the Establishment of a National Judiciary Council during the
Round Table Proceedings], (36) 3 KWARTALNIK KRAJOWA RADA SĄDOWNICTWA 25 (2017);
Andrzej Friszke, Przy Okrągłym Stole. O Polskę–- demokratyczne państwo prawa [By the
Round Table: For Poland -Toward A Rule of Law Country], 37 KWARTALNIK KRAJOWA RADA
SĄDOWNICTWA 29 (2017).
53. DAVIES, supra note 27, at 506 (Jaruzelski’s agreement to shorten his presidential
term); TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE POLISH REVOLUTION: SOLIDARITY 362 (3d ed. 2002)
(describing his “place of honor in Polish history for the way he initiated and then presided over
the transition to democracy from 1989 to 1991,” as weighed regarding the imposition of martial
law in 1981); id. at 363 (describing Jaruzelski’s role in peaceful changes in Poland); id. at 372
(describing a “model of self-restraint”).
54. LESZEK GARLICKI, POLSKIE PRAWO KONSTYTUCYJNE [POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW] 76 (2017) (Pol.).
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commenced interpreting the previously-quoted language in
concretizing the Polish rule of law framework. 55
In a Roundtable agreement, all sitting Supreme Court judges were
terminated by a 1989 law. 56 Twenty-two of the 111 then sitting were
reappointed to a fifty-seven-member bench. 57 Generally, judges in the
lower courts remained in place subject to a required lustration
certification. 58
Between 1989 and 2005, eleven people served as Prime Minister
of Poland. Parliamentary leadership switched among the parties rooted
in the Solidarity movement versus those with ties to the previous
communist regime. 59 Neither the Solidarity movement nor the postcommunist parties had a unified political philosophy and both, to some
degree, included a broad spectrum of political interests from right, left,
labor, and so on. 60
In 2005, the PiS party candidates received a quarter of the vote,
sufficient for a plurality in the parliament and the capacity to form a
coalition government. 61 A PiS leader, Lech Kaczyński, was elected
President. The PiS coalition government collapsed in 2007. 62
In 2007, Platforma Obywatelska (Citizen Platform with the Polish
acronym “PO”) received a plurality in the parliamentary election and
created a coalition with the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (the
previously-mentioned Polish agrarian party’s return to their previous

55. See Leszek Garlicki, Pierwsze Orzeczenie Trybunału Konstyucyjnyjnego—Refleksje
15 Lat Później [The First Judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal—Remarks 15 Years
Later], in TRYBUNAŁ KONSTYTUCY KSIȨGA 15-LECIA [THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL—
THE BOOK OF 15 YEARS] 32 (2001), available at http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/
dokumenty/pierwsza-rozprawa/Leszek_Garlicki_Pierwsza_rozprawa.pdf [https://perma.cc/34
AC-US7Q] (describing the first Constitutional Tribunal case of May 26, 1986, which set limits
on the executive branch’s scope to implement statutes and on retroactive application of law).
56. Lityński, supra note 28.
57. Id.
58. Lustration laws have been defined as “special public employment law that regulates
the process of examining whether a person holding certain higher public positions worked or
collaborated with the repressive apparatus of the communist regime.” See Roman David,
Lustraton Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of Llustration Policy in the Czech
Republic and Poland (1989-2001), 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 388 (2003).
59. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 389-94; LUKOWSKI & ZAWADZKI, supra note 46, at 32023; DAVIES, supra note 27, at 512-13.
60. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 397, 398.
61. THE ECONOMIST, Change of State, supra note 21, at 29, 30; LUKOWSKI & ZAWADSKI,
supra note 46, at 340.
62. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 395-96.
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name) to form a government. 63 In 2010, President Lech Kaczyński led
a delegation of ninety-six prominent Poles to Smolensk, Russia to
commemorate the murder of more than 20,000 Polish officers by the
Soviet secret police in Katyń Forest in 1940. 64 The plane crashed,
killing everyone on board. 65 Under Polish law, Bronisław
Komorowski, the Speaker of the Sejm, assumed the duties of the
president until an election could be held. 66 At his death, Lech
Kaczyński was ending his presidential term and had indicated he would
seek a second term.67 With his death, his twin brother, Jarosław
Kaczyński, became the PiS candidate for President against
Komorowski, who was the PO candidate. 68 Komorowski narrowly
prevailed after two rounds of voting. 69 In 2011, PO remained in power
in the same coalition, the first reelection of a government in the postcommunist period. 70
In the May 2015 Presidential election, the PiS party candidate,
Andrzej Duda, was elected. In the October 2015 parliamentary
election, PiS achieved an absolute majority in the Parliament. 71 The PiS
63. Id. at 396.
64. Nicholas Kulish, Ellen Barry & Michal Piotrowski, Polish President Dies in Jet Crash
in Russia, N.Y. TIMES (April 10, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/
world/europe/11poland.html?module=inline.
65. See id.; see also Anne Applebaum, A Warning from Europe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Oct. 2018, at 53, 59-60 (on the lingering effect of the Smolensk crash on Polish politics).
66. Nicholas Kulish, Amid Uncertainty, Poland Shows Political Resilience, N.Y. TIMES
(April 11, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/world/europe/12poland.html.
67. Luke Harding, Polish President and Leading Advisers Among Victims of Smolensk
Plane Crash, THE GUARDIAN (April 10, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2010/apr/10/polish-president-kaczynski-killed-crash [https://perma.cc/8PL9-ADQT].
68. Matthew Day, Twin Brother of Dead Polish President to Run for Office, THE
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 26, 2010), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/
7635252/Twin-brother-of-dead-Polish-president-to-run-for-office.html
[https://perma.cc/
7BWY-Z488].
69. Nicholas Kulish, Acting President in Poland Wins a Narrow Victory, N.Y. TIMES (July
4, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/05/world/europe/05poland.html.
70. Nicholas Kulish, Poland’s Centrist Leader Secures A Second Term, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
10, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/world/europe/donald-tusk-wins-second-termas-polish-prime-minister.html.
71. Change of State, supra note 21. Although PiS parliamentary candidates received only
37.58% of the votes cast, this was a sufficient plurality to form a government without a coalition.
The Polish Constitution has a 5% threshold such that parties receiving less than 5% cannot be
seated in Parliament. PiS received a ruling majority with the votes of 18.5% of eligible voters.
Rozmawiała Agnieszka Kublik, Prof. Markowski: Demokracja się obroni, ale Wersalu nie
będzie, [Professor Markowski: Democracy will defend itself, but there will be no Versailles),
WYBORCZA.PL (Oct. 28, 2015, 1:00 AM), wyborcza.pl/1,75398,19099177,prof-markowskidemokracja-sie-obroni-ale-wersalu-nie-bedzie.html
[https://perma.cc/M9FN-XTCW];
PAŃSTWOWA KOMISJA WYBORCZA [NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION], Wybory do Sejmu
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party does not have the two-thirds majority required to make
constitutional changes but has adequate voting power to make changes
in law.
B. PiS Government Initiatives with Regard to the Judicial System
2015-2018
Subsection II.B.1 identifies the most significant and damaging
changes to the Polish judicial system since 2015. 72 Subsections II.B.2
and II.B.3 review quotes from the PiS platform and leaders that
evidence their objectives with regard to the judicial system. Subsection
II.C reviews some of the dizzying number of reports and actions on the
Polish situation by regional, international, and nongovernmental
organizations. Finally, Subsection II.D discusses changes to the pre2015 judicial system that the Authors have proposed in the past and
believe should be considered in the future if the Polish political and
legal systems again were proceeding on a rational basis in conformity
to the Polish constitution and international norms.
1. Changes to the Polish Judicial System since 2015
The following lists the serious current problems in the Polish
judicial system while omitting detail on the complex path that brought
them about including multiple amendments, court challenges,
President Andrzej Duda’s summer 2017 veto of two of three major
pieces of legislation concerning the judiciary, the slightly amended
versions that passed soon after, and a myriad of later amendments.73
The following summary relies considerably on the June 2018 reports
from the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers and GRECO’s March and June 2018 reports. These reports

i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015 [Elections to the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of
Poland 2015] (2015), http://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_wyniki_sejm [https://perma.cc/
7JSC-FSX7].
72. European Commission Press Release IP/17/5367, Rule of Law: European Commission
Acts to Defend Judicial Independence in Poland (Dec. 20, 2017), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm [https://perma.cc/6NNL-K4NR].
73. For detailed information through the fall of 2017, see Dariusz Mazur & Waldemar
Żurek, So Called “Good Change” in the Polish System of the Administration of Justice,
https://www.jura.unibonn.de/fileadmin/Fachbereich_Rechtswissenschaft/Einrichtungen/Lehrst
uehle/ Sanders/Dokumente/Good_change_-_7_October_2017_-_word.pdf, (last visited Jan. 31,
2019); see also infra Part II.D and sources cited there.
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are recent assessments by outside bodies following on-site reviews. 74
This Part provides an overview of the state of play at the end of summer
2018. For more recent events, see sources cited in II.C on reports by
international, European, and nongovernmental bodies, some of which
were issued in late 2018. As Professor Wojciech Sadurski cautions,
though, it is important to recognize regarding post-2015 changes to the
Polish legal system that “the sum is more than its parts.” 75 One must
look at the “comprehensiveness and the cumulative effect” of the
changes in Poland, the “functional connections” of the “individual
elements.” 76

74. UN Special Rapporteur on Judicial Independence, Diego Garcia-Sayan (Comm’r for
Human Rights of the Republic of Pol.), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence
of Judges and Lawyers on his Mission to Poland, U.N. DOC.A/HRC/38/38/Add.1 (April 5, 2018)
[hereinafter UNSR]; supra note 1 and accompanying text (information about GRECO);
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GROUP OF STATES AGAINST CORRUPTION [GRECO], FOURTH
EVALUATION ROUND: CORRUPTION PREVENTION IN RESPECT OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT,
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS. ADDENDUM TO THE SECOND COMPLIANCE REPORT–- POLAND
(2018) 11, available at https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-inrespect-of-members-of/16808b7688 [https://perma.cc/48YQ-2GZT] [hereinafter GRECO June
2018]; GRECO, AD HOC REPORT ON POLAND (RULE 34) (2018) 1, available at
https://rm.coe.int/ad-hoc-report-on-poland-rule-34-adopted-by-greco-at-its-79th-plenarym/168079c83c [https://perma.cc/HW46-WBW6] [hereinafter GRECO March 2018]. The March
and June 2018 GRECO reports are under an ad hoc procedure that can be triggered when
GRECO has reliable information that a member State may be “in serious violation of a council
of Europe anti-corruption standard.” See GRECO, Ad Hoc Procedures (Rule 34), available at
https://www.coe.int/en/web890recoo/ad-hoc-procedure-rule-34-[https://perma.cc/3YWPNLG]. In addition to these reports on Poland, GRECO published a 2012 evaluation report,
GRECO, FOURTH EVALUATION ROUND: CORRUPTION PREVENTION IN RESPECT OF MEMBERS
OF PARLIAMENT, JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS. EVALUATION REPORT–- POLAND (2012),
available at https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?
documentId=09000016806c7b1d [https://perma.cc/PYW5-EZ84] [hereinafter GRECO 2012
Report], a 2014 compliance report, GRECO, FOURTH EVALUATION ROUND: CORRUPTION
PREVENTION IN RESPECT OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS.
COMPLIANCE
REPORT–POLAND
(2014),
available
at
https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c7b
20 [https://perma.cc/TAL5-GUZK], and a 2017 compliance report, GRECO, FOURTH
EVALUATION ROUND: CORRUPTION PREVENTION IN RESPECT OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT,
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS. SECOND COMPLIANCE REPORT – POLAND (2017), available at
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommon
SearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680702abf
[https://perma.cc/
943E-TWKT].
75. Sadurski, supra note 9, at 5.
76. Id. at 5, 17-45 (detail on the “capture and transformation” of the Constitutional
Tribunal, assault on the “regular” judiciary, and the law on the Public Prosecutor’s office as
well as their interconnectedness), 70 (“the small details . . . which jointly render the picture
diametrically different from that mandated by the constitution”).
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a. Merging the Minister of Justice and the General Prosecutor
One of the PiS government’s first initiatives, adopted in January
2016 and in force from March 2016, was the merger of the Office of
the Public Prosecutor General with the Minster of Justice. 77 Zbigniew
Ziobro, the current Minister of Justice, also held that office in the 200507 PiS government. When the PO government assumed power, they
took the first steps toward a procedure before the Polish Tribunal of
State that could have resulted in criminal and non-criminal sanctions
against Ziobro. 78 The Parliament eventually desisted in pursuing
charges against Ziobro. 79 Then Prime Minister Donald Tusk said he did
not consider it appropriate for the governing party to institute criminal
proceedings against leaders of the opposition party. 80 In 2010, however,
the PO coalition government split the Prosecutor General function from
the Minster of Justice with the stated purpose of reducing the possibility
of political influence in prosecutions.
Under the 2016 remerger of the functions, the Minister of Justice
has not only supervisory powers over the organization of prosecution
but also authority to intervene in particular prosecutions and give
orders to the inferior prosecutors regarding their action in prosecutions.
This creates the possibility of directly or indirectly influencing the
outcome of cases. An American might question why this is problematic
in that the US Attorney’s Office, which houses federal prosecutors,
functions within the Department of Justice. The US Attorney General,
unlike the combined Polish Minister of Justice and Prosecutor, has little
role in who becomes a judge in the United States and how judges fare
in their careers while the extensive post-2015 legislative changes in
Polish law give the Polish Minister of Justice extensive control of most
aspects of a judge’s career. 81 Hence, the Polish Minister of Justice has
77. See id. at para. 14; GRECO June 2018, supra note 74.
78. Maxim Tomoszek, Politizace Institutu Ustavní Odpovědnosti Jako Jedna z Příčin
Současné Ustavní Krize v Polsku, [Transformation of Constitutional Accountability into
Political Weapon as One of the Causes of the Current Constitutional Crisis in Poland?],
2 ČASOPIS PRO PRÁVNÍ VĚDU A PRAXI 241, 247-50 (2017) (concluding that Ziobro’s tenure as
minister and prosecutor general from 2005-07 evidenced abuse of power for political gains,
describing a highly visible and highly publicized raid on the home of politician Barbara Blida
resulting in her death, and discussing the charges against Ziobro in the impeachment and
constitutional accountability proceedings).
79. Id. at 251.
80. Id. at 252.
81. STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION & EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, WHERE THE
LAW ENDS: THE COLLAPSE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN POLAND - AND WHAT TO DO 8-12
(2018), available at http://citizensobservatory.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ESI-Batory-

892

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:3

extensive power over both those who prosecute and those who hear the
cases prosecuted.
Under recent legislative changes regarding the court system, the
Minister of Justice has considerably expanded power in such matters
as selection of court presidents and judicial discipline. 82 The June 2018
GRECO report refers to the merger of the office of Prosecutor General
with the Minister of Justice as a factor giving “rise to particular concern
in terms of its effects on the separation of powers and the independence
of courts and judges.” 83
b. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal
The UN Special Rapporteur (“UNSP”) devotes seventeen of the
eighty-two paragraphs of his April 2018 report, which was presented
in June 2018 to the UN Human Rights Council, to the CT saga of the
Constitutional Tribunal (“CT” or “Tribunal”). 84 The UNSP describes
the PiS government’s actions with regard to the judiciary as having two
phases, the first being “bringing the Constitutional Tribunal under its
control.” 85 Mr. García-Sayán concludes from his detailed report on
moves against the CT that the government was able to reduce the CT
to a “politically pliant body” and that enabled moving on to other parts
of the judiciary. 86 The UNSP concludes that the “legitimacy and
independence” of the Tribunal are now so undermined as to “cast
serious doubts over its capacity to protect constitutional principles and
to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 87 The UNSP
report focuses on three clusters of action versus the CT: conflict over
appointment of the justices including the Court President; refusal to

Poland-and-the-end-of-the-Rule-of-Law-29-May-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VLE-QD2K]
(tracing the ways the Minister of Justice can now exert significant control of who becomes a
judge, judicial education, the trajectory of a judge’s career, the threat of discipline, and even
extension of retirement age).
82. See, e.g., infra notes 104-107, 132-135 and accompanying text.
83. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 56.
84. Mr. Diego García-Sayán, Special Rapporteur, Presentation on the Independence of
Magistrates and Lawyers at the 38th Session of the Human Rights Council (June 22, 2018),
available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/38/38/Add.1
[https://perma.cc/U6ZU-FS8R]; STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION & EUROPEAN STABILITY
INITIATIVE, supra note 81, at 4-6 (discussing the events regarding the Constitutional Tribunal).
85. UNSR, supra note 74, at para. 15.
86. Id.
87. Id. at para. 73.
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publish and implement CT rulings; and adoption of “‘remedial statutes’
aimed at crippling the Tribunal’s effectiveness.” 88
In October 2015, the PO-led government appointed five judges to
replace five retiring judges. 89 A subsequent CT ruling held that this
Parliament had the right to appoint three of the judges, but the
expiration date of the terms for the other two made this action by the
PO-government illegal. 90 Nonetheless, President Duda refused to
swear in any of the five judges. 91 The new PiS-controlled government
appointed five new judges and passed a resolution purporting to nullify
the appointments of the PO-appointed five. 92 For a period, there were
three “double-judges”—the three PO appointments ruled by the CT to
be legitimate and three others made by the PiS government.
The subsequent tangle of events included December 2015, March
2016, and December 2016 amendments to legislation on CT operation,
parts of which were declared unconstitutional by the CT in March and
August 2016. 93 The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe94
adopted opinions saying that the Polish Parliament’s actions reached
beyond their legislative authority requiring only a simple majority to
constitutional changes requiring a two-thirds majority, which the ruling
government does not have. 95
A new President of the CT was appointed with a procedure
deemed questionable by the Venice Commission. 96 The saga also
includes the government’s refusal to accept the validity of some CT
judgments and publish those opinions. 97 After extreme criticism,
88. Id. at para. 22.
89. Piotr Czarny, Der Streit um den Verfassungsgerichtshof in Polen 2015-2016 [The
Struggle over the Constitutional Court in Poland 2015-2016], 64 OSTEUROPARECHT 5, 6 (2018);
Andrzej Dziadzio, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Die Auseinandersetzung um den
Verfassungsgerichtshof in Polen (2015-2016) [Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? The
Conflict over the Constitutional Court in Poland (2015-2016)], 64 OSTEUROPARECHT 21, 30
(2018).
90. Czarny, supra note 89, at 7.
91. Dziadzio, supra note 89, at 26.
92. Czarny, supra note 89, at 17.
93. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 12.
94. The European Commission for Democracy through Law (commonly called the Venice
Commission) is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters. See THE
VENICE COMM’N OF THE COUNCIL OF EUR., For democracy through law,
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation
[https://perma.cc/W8NH3J47].
95. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 12.
96. GRECO March 2018, supra note 74, at paras. 11, 13.
97. UNSR, supra note 74, at para. 35.
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including that of the Venice Commission, for “pick[ing] and choos[ing]
which judgments of a court are to be published,” the government
published twenty-one judgments with a notation they were in “breach
of the provisions of the act of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 June
2015” and persisted in its refusal to publish other opinions, saying they
were based on “normative acts that had ‘ceased to have effect.’” 98
c. The Polish Supreme Court
Unfortunately, little of the complexity and nuance of post-2015
changes in Polish law and legal system makes its way into the US
mainstream press. On July 4, 2018, however, the front page of the New
York Times featured a large photograph of thousands of Poles in front
of the Supreme Court in Warsaw protesting the forced retirement of
twenty-seven of the seventy-two Polish Supreme Court judges,
including the First President, Małgorzata Gersdorf. A new law on the
Supreme Court lowered the retirement age from seventy to sixty-five,
including for sitting judges whose terms had not expired. 99 Affected
judges could apply to the President for extension, but more than a dozen
affected, including Judge Gersdorf, declined to do so, saying that their
removal from office before completion of their terms was
unconstitutional. Judge Gersdorf vowed to continue coming to work,
saying that, shortening of her term both as First President and as a judge
while still in office was unconstitutional. 100 The post-July events
triggered by the attempted retirement of sitting Supreme Court judges
are described in Subsection C of this Part.
As summarized in the June 2018 GRECO report, other provisions
of the new Supreme Court law have also been of considerable concern
within Poland and to international bodies, particularly the creation of
98. Id. (government publication of the opinions under pressure from European institutions
but with statement that the judgments are not valid); Ustawa o zmianie ustawy - Przepisy
wprowadzające ustawę o organizacji i trybie postępowania przed Trybunałem Konstytucyjnym
oraz ustawę o statusie sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego [Law of April 12, 2018 on
Amending the Law Provisions Introducing the Law on Organization and Procedure at the
Constitutional Tribunal and the Law on the Status on the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal]
Dz. U. 2018 poz. 849, available at prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/
WDU20180000849/O/D20180849.pdf [https://perma.cc/99WF-YUE6] (Pol.).
99. Marc Santora, Poland Purges Its Supreme Court, and Protesters Take to the Streets,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/world/europe/polandsupreme-court-protest.html.
100. THEMIS ASSOCIATION OF JUDGES, Alarming Revolution within the Polish Supreme
Court (July 2, 2018), http://themis-sedziowie.eu/materials-in-english/alarming-revolutionwithin-the-polish-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/AQ9B-QDMH].
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two new chambers of the Supreme Court: one with new powers and
procedures regarding disciplinary proceeding and another creation of
the Chamber for Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs with
jurisdiction over “extraordinary appeals” that could overturn existing
court judgments. 101
The December 2017 Supreme Court Law makes many changes to
the previous disciplinary process for Supreme Court judges. The judges
in the disciplinary chamber are paid a forty percent higher salary, 102
and proceedings include participation of lay judges elected by the
Senate. 103 The Polish President and Minister of Justice are given
considerable powers to direct the process. The President may appoint
a judge as an extraordinary disciplinary prosecutor, taken not only from
the Supreme Court (as in the past), but also from the ordinary courts or
military courts. 104 If the disciplinary offense satisfies the elements of
an intentional crime or intentional tax crime, the President also may
appoint, instead of a judge, a prosecutor from the staff of the highest
level of the national prosecution office. 105 Once such a disciplinary
prosecutor is appointed, a disciplinary proceeding must commence. 106
If the President has knowledge of such crimes and does not appoint an
extraordinary disciplinary prosecutor within thirty days, the Minister
of Justice has the authority to notify the President that the Minister
intends to appoint such a disciplinary prosecutor, and if the President
does not act within thirty days, to do so. 107
The government also proposed legislation allowing reopening of
past judgments without limitation to discovery of new facts. 108 This
generated much concern about retroactivity and stability of the legal
order. Extraordinary appeals could be made by the Prosecutor General

101. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 30.
102. Id. at para. 31 with Polish government response at note 16; Artykuł 48 ¶7 ustawy o
Sądzie Najwyższym z dnia 8.12.2018, Dz. U. 2017 poz. 5 [Law on the Supreme Court, Art. 48,
¶7 (December 8, 2017)] (Pol.).
103. Artykuł 73 ¶1 pkt 1 & 2 ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym z dnia 8.12.2018, Dz. U. 2017
poz. 5 [Law on the Supreme Court, Art. 48, ¶7.1 & 7.2 (December 8, 2017)] (Pol.).
104. Artykuł 76 ¶8 ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym z dnia 8.12.2018, Dz. U. 2017 poz. 5
[Law on the Supreme Court, Art. 48, ¶7 (December 8, 2017)] (Pol.).
105. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 31.
106. Id.
107. Artykuł 76 ¶9 ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym z dnia 8.12.2018, Dz. U. 2017 poz. 5
[Law on the Supreme Court, Art. 48, ¶7 (December 8, 2017)] (Pol.).
108. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 31.
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(Minister of Justice) and the Ombudsman. 109 Lay judges would serve
in these matters as well.
GRECO’s June 2018 report concludes that concerns about these
two new chambers are compounded “by the relatively large
involvement of the executive in the internal proceedings of the SC,”
including enhanced power in selecting the First President and
presidents of chambers. 110 GRECO recommended reconsideration of
the establishment of the two new chambers and reduction in the
executive’s involvement in the Supreme Court. 111 The UNSR’s
summary of concerns about these new chambers includes the
jurisdiction of the Chamber for Extraordinary Control and Public
Affairs with regard to “political sensitive cases” including electoral
disputes and validation of elections and referendums.” 112
d. The National Council on the Judiciary
As previously discussed, one compromise of the Solidarity
Roundtable negotiations was the creation of a strong National Judiciary
Council (“NJC”) to balance retention of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and the military under the control of President Jaruzelski and the
communist party. 113 The April 1989 constitution provided for creation
of the NJC. 114 Implementing legislation in December 1989 stated the

109. Id. at para. 30, n.13. To respond, albeit in a limited way, to European criticism the
Polish parliament narrowed the entities empowered to bring an “extraordinary appeal” after the
GRECO report’s submission in April 2018. See Law on the System of Common Courts, the Act
on the Supreme Court and Some Other Acts, art. 115 (May 10, 2018 amendment), available at
https://www.infor.pl/aktprawny/DZU.2018.105.0001045,ustawa-o-zmianie-ustawy-prawo-oustroju-sadow-powszechnych-ustawy-o-sadzie-najwyzszym-oraz-niektorych-innychustaw.html [https://perma.cc/7CGX-BMGM].
110. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 33; see also UNSR, supra note 74, at
paras. 59-62 (referring to the creation of these new chambers).
111. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74 at paras. 31, 33, 35.
112. UNSR, supra note 74, at para. 62.
113. Grajewski, supra note 52; Friszke, supra note 52.
114. Artykuł 1 ustęp 17 Ustawy z dnia 07.04.1989 o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej
Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, Dz. U. 1989, nr19 poz. 101 [Law on amending the Constitution of
the People’s Republic of Poland, Art. 1, section 17 (April 7, 1989)] (Pol.).
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NJC’s mission to safeguard the independence of courts and judges.115
This language is now part of the Polish constitution. 116
The current Polish constitution also provides that fifteen of the
twenty-five members of the National Judiciary Council should be
chosen from judges of the Supreme Court, common courts,
administrative courts, and military courts. 117 The remaining ten
members are the First President of the Supreme Court, the Minister of
Justice, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, an
appointee of the Polish President, and six members of Parliament (four
elected by the Sejm and two by the Senate). 118
Since its creation, the NJC’s functions have included selecting
candidates for positions for the first instance courts, appeals courts, and
Supreme Court for a final decision by the Polish President. 119 NJC
powers also include filing motions with the Constitutional Tribunal
regarding the constitutionality of laws on courts and judges, adopting
the judicial code of ethics, and giving opinions on draft laws
concerning the judiciary. 120
Until the December 2017 amendments to the Law on the National
Council of the Judiciary, the fifteen judicial representatives were
elected by various subparts of the judiciary. 121 Those amendments
changed the selection method for judicial members to election by the
Sejm with a new procedure for their nomination. 122 The new law also
provided that the term for the fifteen current judge members would end
115. Artykuł 1 ustęp 2 ustawy z dnia 20.12.1989 o Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa, Dz.U.
1989, nr 73 poz. 435 [Law on National Judiciary Council, art. 1, sec. 2 (December 20, 1989)]
(Pol.).
116. Artykuł 186 ustęp 1 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 02.04.1997
[Republic of Poland Const. art. 186., sec. 1 (April 2, 1997)] (National Judiciary Council as
guardian of court and judicial independence) (Pol.).
117. Artykuł 187 ustęp 1 pkt 2 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 02.04.1997
[Republic of Poland Const. Art. 187, section 1.2, (April 2, 1997)] (composition and mode of
election of the National Judiciary Council] (Pol.).
118. Id.
119. GRECO March 2018, supra note 74, at para. 24.
120. Id.
121. Artykuł 11 ustawy z dnia 12.05.2011 o Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa, (Dz.U) nr
126 pos 714, 5.12.2011 [Law on the National Council of the Judiciary, Chapter 1 Gen. Regs.,
(May 12, 2011)] (Pol.). From their membership, the Polish Supreme Court elected two
representatives, the Supreme Administrative Court two; two from the Circuit Court of Appeals
judges; one from the Military Courts, and eight elected by the local assemblies of the full court
system. One rationale the PiS government has used for the change in selection of judicial
members of the NJC was underrepresentation of the judges from the lowest courts. See GRECO
June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 26.
122. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 26.
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in February 2018 regardless of where they were in the four-year terms
provided in Article 187 of the Constitution. 123
The PiS government does not have a sufficient majority to change
the Polish constitution. The Polish Ombudsman and the Helsinki
Foundation for Human Rights are among those challenging the law
changing the method of selection of the judges as unconstitutional. 124
Given a boycott by most of the judiciary, only eighteen judges
stood for election for the fifteen slots. 125 Most were judges who had
been working in the Ministry of Justice on secondment. 126 The GRECO
June 2018 conclusion is that “effectively 21 of the 25 members of the
NJC are now elected by Parliament (a majority of which by the ruling
party).” 127 GRECO cites their standard that at least half of the members
of a National Judiciary Council should be elected by judges from their
peers. 128
e. The Ordinary Courts
Acting under a new law on the ordinary courts in July 2017, the
Minister of Justice quickly moved to dismiss 160 presidents and vice-

123. Id. at para. 27.
124. Commissioner for Citizen’s Rights, Opinion of the Commissioner for the Draft
Amendment to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary, RPO (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/opinia-rpo-do-projektu-nowelizacji-ustawy-o-krajowejradzie-s%C4%85downictwa [https://perma.cc/8RWN-PM92]; HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, The Proposed Changes to the National Judiciary Council Violate the
Constitution - The HFHR Opinion, HFHR (July 12, 2017), http://www.hfhr.pl/projektowanezmiany-w-krs-naruszaja-konstytucje-opinia-hfpc/ [https://perma.cc/Q2KB-NK6A].
This
background section focuses on entities outside the Polish government, e.g., the European Union,
international organizations, and nongovernmental entities that have documented and challenged
governmental changes to the judicial system as well as the activities of the judges themselves.
The current Polish Ombudsman, Adam Bodnar, was appointed by the previous government in
September 2015. His office’s prodigious efforts regarding the judiciary are beyond the scope of
this article. They were recognized by the Norwegian Rafto Foundation with their 2018 Laureate
Human Rights Defender award, see RAFTO FOUNDATION, The 2018 Rafto prize to Ombudsman
Adam Bodnar, https://www.rafto.no/news/the-2018-rafto-prize-to-ombudsman-adam-bodnar
[https://perma.cc/GJ5A-JFE5]; Camilla Knudsen, Polish Ombudsman Wins Norwegian Human
Rights Award, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-politicsnorway/polish-ombudsman-wins-norwegian-human-rights-award-idUSKCN1M718A
[https://perma.cc/6FQ4-4WCA] (pointing out that four past Rafto laureates, later won the Nobel
Peace Prize).
125. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 27.
126. Id.
127. Id. at para. 29.
128. Id.
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presidents of courts below the Supreme Court, “ordinary courts.”129
Affected judges were given no reason or opportunity to appeal. 130 The
retirement age for judges was lowered. 131 The Ministry of Justice was
given the power to extend service beyond retirement analogous to the
power given to the President with regard to the Supreme Court.132
GRECO comments that the expanded power of the Minister of Justice
should be seen in context of this office having assumed the functions
of the Prosecutor General and the increase in the powers of this
office. 133 Those expanded powers include selecting judges for
disciplinary courts for all ordinary court judges and the disciplinary
commissioners who act as prosecutors. 134
While recognizing a legitimate role for a Justice Minister in court
administration in matters like budgeting, the GRECO team that visited
Poland in May 2018 expressed concern about the risk of “overreach”
in the current system given the “extensive powers on the executive
(who is at the same time the Prosecutor General).” 135
2. The PiS Vision of Law and Justice
Following the 2015 election, PiS immediately moved to
implement its concept of “law and justice,” the English translation of
the party’s name Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. 136 Before turning to post2015 PiS government actions with regard to the judicial system, this
Subsection reviews PiS statements on the party’s view of law and
justice.
The 2005 “Trawny case” on return of Polish property to a by-thenGerman citizen was prominently in the press at the time and is still

129. Id. at para. 45. For a report of the process of these dismissals and their aftermath,
see HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IT STARTS WITH THE PERSONNEL:
REPLACEMENT OF COMMON COURT PRESIDENTS AND VICE PRESIDENTS FROM AUGUST 2017
TO FEBRUARY 2018 (2018), available at www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/It-startswith-the-personnel.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA6B-FR9C].
130. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 45.
131. Id. at para. 41.
132. Id. at para. 41.
133. Id. at para. 42.
134. Id. at para. 50.; Artykuł 110(a) ¶1 and 112 ¶3 ustawy prawo o ustroju sądów
powszechnych from 27.7.2001, Dz. U. 2001, nr 98, poz. 1070 [Law on the Ordinary Courts, Art.
110(a), ¶1 and 112 ¶3 (July 27, 2001)] (Pol.); Tekst jednolity z dnia 14 grudnia 2018, Dz. U.
2019 poz. 52 [Consolidated text, Official Journal 2019, position 52 (Dec. 14, 2018)] (Pol.).
135. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 51.
136. Infra subsection II.B.2.
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referred to by PiS Party Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński. 137 Kaczyński’s
comments on the matter were early salvos in what later became a fullscale attack on the Polish court system. 138 Ms. Trawny was a Polish
citizen living in the Mazury region of Poland in the mid-1970s. 139 She
moved to Germany for better economic opportunity, was divested of
her Polish citizenship by Polish government, and divested of her
property in Poland. 140 Ms. Trawny became a German citizen in the
1970s. 141 In the mid-2000s, she sought return of her property in the
Polish courts. 142 The Polish Supreme Court affirmed a lower court
decision holding her loss of citizenship illegal and returning some
property in the Mazury region to Ms. Trawny, hence requiring the Poles
occupying the property to leave. 143 The Court also awarded
compensation for additional property that could not be returned. 144
Kaczyński criticized the decision, saying, “In the post-German
property cases, the courts should observe the Polish raison d’État and
the Polish national interest.” 145 Recently Kaczyński has labelled judges
137. For background on the Trawny case and Jarosław Kaczyński’s recent comments on
it, see Za co Kaczyński zaatakował sędziów w Olsztynie, [Instead Kaczyński Attacked the
Judges], WYBORCZA.PL (September 24, 2018, 4:45 PM),
http://olsztyn.wyborcza.pl/
olsztyn/7,48726,23958052,za-to-kaczynski-zaatakowal-sedziow-w-olsztynie.html.
138. Jarosław Kaczyński: German claim due to Polish policy of apologizing, WPROST
(May 17, 2008, 7:04 PM), https://www.wprost.pl/129945/J-Kaczynski-niemieckie-roszczenieefektem-polityki-przepraszania.html [https://perma.cc/3Q53-M4GD].
139. Polish court evicts families from house owned by German, DW (Dec. 11, 2009),
https://www.dw.com/en/polish-court-evicts-families-from-house-owned-by-german/a-4912979
[https://perma.cc/VBY3-3WZN].
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Judgement of the Polish Supreme Court from the 13th of December 2005, IV CK
304/05 (Pol.); Julika Makaro, Swoi i obcy w dyskursie prasowym na przykładzie wypowiedzi
prasowych dotyczących Agnes Trawny, [“We” and “They” in the press discourse by the example
of press statements concerning Agnes Trawny], 1 STUDIA MIGRACYJNE – PRZEGLĄD
POLONIJNY at 55 (2016).
144. Makaro, supra note 143, at 56.
145. The Polish Supreme Court decided two cases in Ms. Trawny’s favor: return of the
property confiscated by the communists and compensation for the usage of her property without
title. This generated numerous critical statements from the PiS as well as other parties like the
SLD – Alliance of the Democratic Left. Jest odwołanie od wyroku w sporze z Agnes Trawny,
[Appeal from judgment in dispute regarding Agnes Trawny], LEX (July 6, 2018, 10:32 AM),
http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/jest-odwolanie-od-wyroku-w-sporze-z-agnes-trawny
[https://perma.cc/ME9M-CVWT]; Wyrok ws. Agnes Trawny źle swiadczy o polskich sądach”
[The Agnes Trawny verdict shows what is wrong with the Polish courts”], WP WIADOMOŚCI
(Dec. 18, 2009, 11:45 AM), https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/wyrok-ws-agnes-trawny-zle-swiadczy-opolskich-sadach-6032760428679809a [https://perma.cc/KV43-9D8R]. On the famous comment
of J. Kaczyński, see SN uchylił wyrok ws. majątku “późnych przesiedleńców,” [The Supreme
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who would decide in this way as ojkofobic, harboring a hatred of their
native country. 146 PiS Party Chairman Kaczyński has often stated his
view that judges should be a part of the apparatus of the state, fulfilling
the political objectives of the ruling majority, identified with the
interests of the state. 147 In Kaczyński’s eyes, observance of the law
should not justify a judicial decision if it differs from the interest of the
nation. 148 This explains the name of the party: Law and Justice. In this
name, justice questions the value of the law by exalting other more
metaphysical categories, which are necessary to legitimize the law. The
justice component takes on a nationalist perspective—the law cannot
produce effects against the interest of the nation, as defined by the
governing party. With comments on the Trawny case, Kaczyński also
seeks to reactivate anti-German resentments in Poland, 149 as a kind of
Euro-skeptical vehicle for political purposes. The courts and judges are
also the victims of such perception of the law and political goals.
Court overturned the verdict on the property of „late displaced persons”], LEX (July 15, 2010),
www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/sn-uchylil-wyrok-ws-majatku-poznych-przesiedlencow
[https://perma.cc/S36V-NGPN]; see also Andrzej Mężyński, Kaczyński: Niech Tusk Odkupi
Ziemię od Niemców, [Kaczyński: Let Tusk by the land from the Germans], DZIENNIK.PL (June
7, 2010, 4:16 PM), wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/71466,kaczynski-niech-tuskodkupi-ziemie-od-niemcow.html [https://perma.cc/9XZA-BKZF].
146. Magdalena Nowicka-Franczak, Niemiłość narodowa [National Non-Love], 1
TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, at 87 (2019); Za co Kaczyński zaatakował sędziów w Olsztynie,
[What Kaczyński attacked the judges for in Olsztyn], WYBORCZA.PL (Sept. 24, 2018, 4:45 PM),
http://olsztyn.wyborcza.pl/olsztyn/7,48726,23958052,za-to-kaczynski-zaatakowal-sedziow-wolsztynie.html.
147. On October 17, 2018, GAZETA WYBORCZA published a special issue of their
newspaper called Czarna księga: trzech lat rządów PiS [The Black Book: Three Years of PiS
Rule]. See Black is Black. PiS’s Black Book of Government and Konstytucja poster on
Wednesday with Wyborcza, WYBORCZA.PL (October 12, 2018, 2:16 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/
7,95791,24031318,czarna-ksiega-rzadow-pis-w-srode-z-wyborcza.html. The Black Book has
thirty-two chapters addressing various aspects of the country’s situation, published among
borders with a timeline of events. While the entire issue is not available for download, Chapter
2 by University of Warsaw professor Marcin Matczak, which describes PiS’s philosophy of
government and actions with regard to the courts, is available at Marcin Matczak, The end of
separation of powers, WYBORCZA.PL (Oct. 17, 2018, 12:57 AM), http://wyborcza.pl/
7,166575,24049890,koniec-trojpodzialu-wladzy.html https://perma.cc/AD3E-UYPR].
148. Id. (discussing the flaw in equating a “party leader’s intuition” with a determination
of the nation’s will) (available in Polish, translated by Frydeyrk Stanisław Zoll).
149. On the symbolic relevance of the Agnes Trawny case in the Polish internal debate on
the proprietary relationships related to the previous German population of the former German
territories, irrespective of the fact that the Trawny case is rather specific and not representative
of the majority of the Polish-German proprietary relationships, see Julita Makaro, Swoi i obcy w
dyskursie prasowym na przykładzie wypowiedzi prasowych dotyczących Agnes Trawny [“We”
and “They” in the press discourse by the example of press statements concerning Agnes
Trawny], 1 STUDIA MIGRACYJNE – PRZEGLĄD POLONIJNY, at 56-66 (2016).
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This seed of unhappiness with the court system blossomed
fulsomely in the PiS 2009 Program section on “legal impossibilism,” a
concept often invoked by PiS Party Chair Kaczyński and others in the
PiS party. 150 The 2009 program defines the legal impossibilism as “the
programmatic inability of the State to undertake many actions
necessary for the protection of its interests and the wellbeing of its
citizens.” 151 In addition to limiting things the state “needs to do,” the
concept also is described as “petrifying a post-communist status quo,”
meaning collusion among government officials and business people
who profit from the collusion. 152 The program says that the “ideology
and practice” of legal impossibilism not only “helps to maintain postcommunist social relationships but also results from the reluctance of
some Polish elites to have a strong state.” 153 The program elaborates,
saying that Poland, in wishing to avoid the totalitarianism of the past,
now has a government with “excessive restriction of the democratic
state’s actions to benefit its citizens” and an “over-idealistic
understanding of the division and balance of power among the branches
of government.” 154 The program describes “the hyperactivity of the
Constitutional Tribunal” as one of the manifestations of
impossibilism. 155 The program decries court decisions that overturn

150. PRAWO I SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ, PIS 2009 PROGRAM (2009), http://old.pis.org.pl/
dokumenty.php?s=partia&iddoc=148 [https://perma.cc/7P42-N74A] (last visited July 31, 2018)
(available in Polish, translated by Co-author Zoll). Kaczyński uses “Impossibilismus” as a
combat term to undermine democracy in Poland. See Christian Esch, Ich Bin das Volk: Ein
Autoritärer Herrschaftstypus Verändert die Welt. Wie Erklärt Sich der Erfolg von Putin, Trump,
Erdoğan, Xi? Die Spiegel-Titelstory, SPIEGEL (June 8, 2018, 3:39 PM) http://www.spiegel.de/
plus/xi-jinping-wladimir-putin-donald-trump-erdogan-ich-bin-das-volk-a-00000000-0002-000
1-0000-000157769149 [https://perma.cc/6EVC-NS2L]; Marc Santora, The Roots of Poland’s
Defiance of the European Union, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
12/25/world/europe/poland-eu-judicial-laws.html; Roger Cohen, Opinion, How Democracy
Became the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/opinion/sunday/
orban-hungary-kaczynski-poland.html (terming legal impossibilism as the counterbalancing
power vested in an independent constitutional judiciary); see Matczak, supra note 147 on PiS’s
views on impossibilism.
151. PIS 2009 PROGRAM, supra note 150, at 13.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 14.
154. Id; see also Michael Meyer-Resende, Is Europe’s Problem Illiberal Majoritarianism
or Creeping Authoritarianism?, CARNEGIE EUROPE, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/06/13/iseurope-s-problem-illiberal-majoritarianism-or-creeping-authoritarianism-pub-76587
[https://perma.cc/4XC9-HY8A].
155. PIS 2009 PROGRAM, supra note 150, at 14.
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“acts expressing the will of the majority and the result of the arduous
work of democratically-elected state bodies.” 156
Since taking power in 2015, PiS government officials describe the
objectives of court “reform” in neutral terms like enhanced efficiency
and accountability, combined with allusions to corruption and lingering
communist taint. 157 Generally, government officials no longer refer to
removing judicial obstacles to the government’s policy initiatives and
to PiS’s view of the country’s best interests. 158 In a July 2018 interview,
however, PiS Party Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński said, “The European
Commission will not break the Polish will to complete the reform,
because it is either-or. If the judiciary is not reformed, other reforms
have little sense, because sooner or later they will be through such
courts as we have, negated, withdrawn.” 159 Here, he explicitly says that
success in the PiS government’s initiatives, presumably including such
matters as the manner of election to the European Parliament, the law
governing public demonstrations, control of public media, compliance
156. Id.
157. See generally The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, White Paper on the Reform of
the Polish Judiciary (2018), available at https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/files/white_paper_
en_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7P7-J3BG]; Mateusz Morawiecki (Opinion), WASHINGTON
EXAMINER, (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/prime-minister-mateuszmorawiecki-why-my-government-is-reforming-polands-judiciary/article/2643279
[https://perma.cc/PYB4-37RX]. For a detailed response to the Polish government’s White Paper
by Iustitia, one of the two major Polish judges’ associations, see Iustitia’s March 16, 2018 paper
and supplement: Response to the White Paper Compendium on the Reforms of the Polish Justice
System, IUSTITIA (Mar. 16, 2018), http://www.iustitia.pl/informacje/2172-response-to-thewhite-paper-compendium-on-the-reforms-of-the-polish-justice-system-presented-by-thegovernment-of-the-republic-of-poland-to-the-european-commission
[https://perma.cc/222S3ZG5].
158. PiS had learned some lessons from their 2005-07 time in power when initiatives were
blocked in the courts. See INT’L BAR ASS’N HUM. RTS INST., JUSTICE UNDER SIEGE; A REPORT
ON THE RULE OF LAW IN POLAND 5 (2007), available at https://www.ibanet.org/
Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=06d75809-1dce-49e3-97f4-8de8d4d454ff
[https://perma.cc/AT64-4P94] (report of a September 2007 fact-finding mission to Poland by
the IBA’s Human Rights Institute and the Council of Bars & Law Societies of Europe in which
they describe PiS as then “embark[ing] on a campaign to gain control over the entire judicial
system”).
159. Dominika Sitnicka, Jarosław Kaczyński wyjawia całą prawdę o reformie
sądownictwa [Jarosław Kaczyński reveals the whole truth about teform of the judiciary], OKO
PRESS (July 9, 2018), https://oko.press/jaroslaw-kaczynski-wyjawia-cala-prawde-reformiesadownictwa/ [https://perma.cc/H7LP-28EW]; In the New “Network”: A Unique Interview With
the PiS President, SIECI PRAWDY (July 8, 2018), https://www.wsieciprawdy.pl/w-nowym-sieciwyjatkowy-wywiad-z-prezesem-pis-pnews-3668.html [https://perma.cc/LR7E-5FZ8] (“Jeśli
nie zreformuje się sądownictwa, inne reformy mają mały sens, bo prędzej czy później zostaną
przez takie sądy, jakie mamy, zanegowane, cofnięte”) (available in Polish, translated by Coauthor Zoll).
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with environmental regulations, treatment of civil society
organizations, and so on, depend on having courts compliant with the
government’s wishes. 160
3. The PiS Campaign against the Judiciary
Diego García-Sayán, the UN Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Judges and Lawyers (“Special Rapporteur”), visited
Poland in October 2017 in preparation for a June 2018 presentation to
the Human Rights Council of the UN General Assembly. His April
2018 report, prepared for the June UN Human Rights Council session,
describes the September 2017 “Fair Courts” campaign of the Polish
National Foundation, an organization funded by seventeen state-owned
companies “with the official aim of promoting large-scale reform of
the judiciary.” 161 The Special Rapporteur’s report describes the
campaign’s billboards, television and social media advertisements, and
dedicated portal as providing a “distorted image of the judiciary,
depicting judges as ‘the enemy’ of Polish people and an evil in Polish
society.” 162 The Special Rapporteur characterized the effort as a “largescale propaganda attack against the judiciary, who are depicted by the
ruling majority as a ‘caste,’ a ‘State within the State’, an entirely selfgoverning corporation which aims solely at defending its interests and
is not accountable to the society.” 163 The Special Rapporteur describes
the campaign as making “instrumental use of a few and isolated cases
in which judges had been involved in illicit activities to demonize the
judiciary as a whole.” 164
The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (“HFHR”) in Poland
submitted a report to the Special Rapporteur during his October 2017
visit. The HFHR report describes the Fair Courts campaign as a
160. Za co Kaczyński zaatakował sędziów w Olsztynie, [Instead Kaczyński Attacked the
Judges], GAZETA WYBORCZA (Sept. 24, 2018, 16:45), http://olsztyn.wyborcza.pl/olsztyn/
7,48726,23958052,za-to-kaczynski-zaatakowal-sedziow-w-olsztynie.html.
161. UNSR, supra note 74, at paras. 17-19.
162. UNSR, supra note 74, at para. 19. For a detailed response to the Fair Courts
campaign’s allegations by the National Judiciary Council then still in office, see Kampania
Billboardowa: a Prawda Jest Taka [The Billboard Campaign: And the Truth is This], KRAJOWA
RADA SĄDOWNICTWA, http://krs.pl/pl/rzecznik-prasowy/a-prawda-jest-taka
[https://web.
archive.org/web/20180418050443/http://krs.pl/pl/rzecznik-prasowy/a-prawda-jest-taka], cited
in ANNA WÓJCIK, FREEDOM HOUSE, NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2018 - POLAND 13 (2018),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NiT2018_Poland_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R79FLHKU].
163. UNSR, supra note 74, at para. 19.
164. Id.
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response to the Free Courts slogan of the July 2017 massive Polish
street protests regarding the judiciary. 165 They report the Polish
National Foundation spent almost PLN19 million (almost US$5.5
million) on the campaign. 166 On October 31, 2017, the Polish television
channel TVN24 reported that the Polish National Foundation had
retained the Washington D.C. consulting firm, White House Writers
Group, for an English-language campaign with five objectives
including to
Explain that the reform of the judiciary in Poland is crucial for the
elimination of corruption, impunity and delays, which make access
to justice difficult for thousands of Polish citizens every year. It is
also designed to restore the checks and balances, eliminated by the
Soviet-style judiciary, which the newly independent Poland
inherited over a quarter of a century ago. 167

The information reported came from the Foreign Agent
Registration Act (“FARA”) filing made by the D.C. firm, which
included the contract with the Polish National Foundation at a rate of
US$45,000 per month plus reasonable expenses up to ten percent of the
fee with a three-month advance. 168 On December 31, 2018, the Polish
National Foundation filed the 2016 and 2017 substantive and financial
activity reports, which Polish law requires with regard to
foundations. 169 The reports confirmed nearly half of the Foundation’s
2017 budget was spent on the campaign. 170
As in the 2009 platform, PiS officials continue referring to a
communist taint allegedly hanging over the judiciary. For example, in
an April 2017 interview, Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro, said:
165. HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN POLAND
– ATTACKS ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION 33 (2017).
166. Id.
167. The Polish National Foundation to Launch its “Fair Courts” Campaign Abroad,
TVN24 (Oct. 31, 2017, 10:39 AM), https://www.tvn24.pl/tvn24-news-in-english,157,m/thepolish-national-foundation-to-launch-its-fair-courts-campaign-abroad,786067.html.
[https://perma.cc/J4TB-CALZ].
168. Id.
169. 8,4 mln złotych na "Sprawiedliwe Sądy", pół miliona na pensje zarządu. Znamy
finanse PFN [8.4 million zlotys for “Fair Courts,” half a million for the board’s salaries. We
know PFN’s finances], TVN24 (Jan. 1, 2019), https://konkret24.tvn24.pl/polska,108/8-4-mlnzlotych-na-sprawiedliwe-sady-pol-miliona-na-pensje-zarzadu-znamy-finanse-pfn,897127.html
[https://perma.cc/D8D8-2Z6C] (including reporting on conflicting statements on the PNF’s
relationship to the government, investigations and court decisions on legal issues related to the
campaign).
170. Id.
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The judiciary had 25 years to purify itself and elaborate conduct
standards. And, they have done nothing so they lost their
opportunity. Today the democratically-elected politicians need to
change it. Repair of the judicial system is the most important issue
for which the voters elected us. I will not retreat in the battle for
justice and fairness in Poland, and I will fulfil the program whose
objective is that the justice system is more protective of honest
people. 171

In a December 13, 2017 opinion piece in a conservative on-line
newsmagazine, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki charged
that the Roundtable Talks allowed General Jaruzelski to “nominate an
entirely new bench of Communist-era judges to staff the postcommunist courts.” 172 In his study of post-communist judicial selfgovernment in Central and Eastern Europe, Czech scholar David Kosař
refers to Poland as an exception to the region’s common pattern of
“rebuild[ing] their judiciaries with essentially the same personnel”
because “most judges of the Polish Supreme Court (not of the lower
courts) were removed from office.” 173 With the government transition
in Poland having occurred almost thirty years ago, most lower court
judges who were in office then likely have retired. 174

171. Zbigniew Ziobro: Nie cofnę się w walce o sprawiedliwość, [Zbigniew Ziobro: I will
not turn back in the fight for justice], WMP.PL PARLAMENTARNY, https://www.wnp.pl/
parlamentarny/ludzie/zbigniew-ziobro-nie-cofne-sie-w-walce-o-sprawiedliwosc,22183.html
[https://perma.cc/E4T9-PNYR] (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (available in Polish, translated by
Co-author Zoll).
172. Mateusz Morawiecki (Opinion), supra note 157; see supra notes 56 and 57 and
accompanying text for numbers of Polish Supreme Court judges replaced.
173. Kosař¸ supra note 4, at 3 n.11.
174. The current heated climate on new Supreme Court appointments has included debate
regarding PiS allegations that sitting Supreme Court judges made dishonorable decisions in the
martial law period from 1981-1983. Premier o “haniebnych wyrokach”. Ilu sędziów Sądu
Najwyższego orzekało w stanie wojennym? [Prime Minister About “shameful sentences”. How
many Supreme Court judges ruled during martial law?], TVN24 (July 9, 2018, 8:04 AM),
https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/ktorzy-sedziowie-sadu-najwyzszego-orzekali-wstanie-wojennym,851747.html [https://perma.cc/UXF9-JDRF]; “Pamiętam jeden wyrok”.
Pozostałe “były ze swiadomością, że będzie amnestia” [“I remember one sentence”. The others
“were aware that there would be an amnesty”], TVN24 (July 16, 2018, 5:15 PM),
https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/sedzia-jozef-iwulski-a-procesy-stanuwojennego,854167.html [https://perma.cc/3A5B-RA95]; Jacek Gądek, Józef Iwulski do dymisji.
Jak najszybciej. Nie ma moralnego prawa być najważniejszym sędzią [Józef Iwulski to tesign as
soon as possible. There is no moral right to be the most important judge], GAZETA.PL (July 17,
2017, 4:20 PM), http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,161770,23683378,jacek-gadeksedzia-jozef-iwulski-do-dymisji-jak-najszybciej.html [https://perma.cc/8SQQ-4KG9].
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PiS also rails about corrupt judges, although their documents have
provided very few examples. 175 GRECO, in their Fourth Evaluation
Round report in 2012, cited a Eurobarometer survey with thirty-two
percent of Polish respondents saying corruption in the judiciary was
widespread. 176 GRECO noted that this is identical to the European
average, expressed concern about public trust in the institution, and
made recommendations directed toward improved public
perception. 177 The 2012 report notes that those to whom their team
spoke—inside the government and out—“generally concurred that
corruption within the judiciary was not a widespread phenomenon.”178
In attempting to explain why the perception of corruption might be
significantly higher than the reality, GRECO reported suggestions
received during their site visit: weak understanding in the public of the
legal system, lack of transparency, 179 “hermetic” judicial disciplinary
proceedings, and Poland’s broad form of judicial immunity. 180
C. Reports and Actions of International, European, and
Nongovernmental Bodies regarding Polish Government Actions since
2015
While it may seem that the historic launching of the first EU
Article 7 proceeding is the most momentous external event in the Polish
judicial independence saga, the complementary functions of the other
parts of this Subsection should be seen in conjunction with the Article
7 proceeding. These are the Polish government actions that are now
freed to go forward with neutered courts; the prodigious efforts by
175. See Iustitia’s response to Government White Paper, supra note 157.
176. GRECO 2012 Report, supra note 74, at para. 15.
177. Id. at para. 15 and 224, vii-xi.
178. Id. at 15; see also European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Position Paper of
the Board of the ENCJ on the membership of the KRS of Poland, para. 4.1, (August 16, 2018),
available at https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-webencj2017-p/News/ENCJ%20Board%20position%20paper%20on%20KRS%20Poland.pdf (on
the lack of evidence supporting the Polish government’s allegations of corruption and
communist taint in the Polish judiciary).
179. Kosař¸ supra note 4, at 15 (commenting that civil law judicial systems generally are
less transparent than those in common law countries).
180. GRECO 2012 Report, supra note 74, at para. 15, 224, vii-xi (GRECO
recommendations for improvement regarding the asset declaration process and conflict of
interest guidance, which seem directed toward improving the public perception of the judiciary
rather than a GRECO finding of serious or widespread judicial corruption to be “rooted out”);
see also supra notes 333-335 and accompanying text with the authors’ suggestions on reasons
the public might be frustrated with the courts and identify corruption as the reason even if that
were not the case.
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nongovernmental and international organizations to document the
constantly-changing situation in Poland; and the Court of Justice of the
European Union (“CJEU”) front, which has opened alongside the
Article 7 proceeding.
1. PiS Initiatives beyond Judicial “Reform”
The November 2017 European Parliament (“EP”) resolution,181
European Commission’s December 2017 Reasoned Proposal in
accordance with Article 7, 182 and many reports and statements by
major non-governmental organizations and regional and international
entities describe issues beyond judicial independence that are of
concern in Poland. 183 These include a multi-front effort to destabilize
non-governmental organizations and organize counter “governmentorganized-governmental organizations;” 184 government actions with
regard to the public media; 185 changes in criminal, police, civil service,

181. EUR. PARL. DOC. (P8_TA 2017/0442) (2017).
182. Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union
Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 835) (2017). The European
Parliament had commenced a similar procedure but withdrew its application to avoid
duplication. See European Parliament to Vote on ‘Nuclear Option’ Against Poland,
EURACTIV (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/europeanparliament-to-vote-on-atomic-option-against-poland/ [https://perma.cc/392C-3XX9]; Alice
Cuddy, What is ‘Article 7’ and Why Was it Triggered Against Poland?, EURONEWS (Dec. 20,
2017),
www.euronews.com/2017/12/20/what-is-article-7-and-why-was-it-triggered-againstpoland [https://perma.cc/TE8M-8UW2]; Rafał Badowski, Parlament Europejski wycofuje
procedurę ws. artykułu 7, ale PiS i tak nie ma się z czego cieszyć [European Parliament is
withdrawing the Article 7 procedure, but PiS is not happy about it anyway], NA:TEMAT (Poland),
(Jan. 16, 2018), http://natemat.pl/227539,parlament-europejski-wycofuje-procedure-wsartykulu-7-ale-pis-i-tak-nie-ma-sie-z-czego-cieszyc [https://perma.cc/EJZ5-F8J9].
183. Poland 2017/2018, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europeand-central-asia/poland/report-poland/ [https://perma.cc/6JWZ-GFAW] (last visite July 6,
2018).
184. Poland’s Right-Wing Government Takes Steps to Control NGO Funding, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/polands-right-wing-government-takes-stepsto-control-ngo-funding/a-40535610 [https://perma.cc/4JYV-PMCR].
185. Jan Cieński, New Media Law Gives Polish Government Fuller Control, POLITICO
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-crisis-constitution-kaczynski-duda/
[https://perma.cc/V3RB-6UE7].

2019] JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 909
and counter-terrorism law; 186 a law limiting the right of assembly; 187
Poland’s refusal to implement a European Court of Justice order on
logging in a UNESCO World Heritage site and European Court of
Human Rights issues regarding return of asylum-seekers to Belarus;188
issues regarding women’s reproductive health; 189 change in laws
regarding domestic violence; 190 media reports of police surveillance of
opposition and civil society leaders; 191 and the November 11, 2017
march by far-right groups termed “xenophobic and fascist” by the
November 15 European Parliament resolution. 192 As described in
Subsection II.C.2 on the PiS vision of law and justice, one of PiS’s
founding tenets is frustration at court actions their leaders see as
thwarting policies PiS deems to protect the interests of the Polish nation
and its citizens. 193 Many of the previously-listed initiatives presumably
would be seen by PiS as such interests.

186. Ruaidhrí Giblin, High Court Judge Seeks EU Ruling on Effect of Polish Law
Changes, THE IRISH TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-andlaw/courts/high-court/high-court-judge-seeks-eu-ruling-on-effect-of-polish-law-changes1.3424530 [https://perma.cc/6TX6-7XUU].
187. Rick Lyman & Joanna Berendt, Protests Erupt in Poland Over New Law on Public
Gatherings, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/world/europe/
poland-protests.html; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE POWER OF ‘THE STREET’: PROTECTING
THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL PROTEST IN POLAND (2018), available at https://www.amnesty.be/
IMG/pdf/poland_report_final_for_upload.pdf [https://perma.cc/G85T-6T42].
188. Bistieva et al. v. Poland, App. No. 75157/14, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-182210 [https://perma.cc/T9K8-BBBS]; Arthur Neslen, Poland Violated EU Laws
by Logging in Białowieża Forest, Court Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/poland-violated-eu-laws-by-logging-inbiaowieza-forest-says-ecj [https://perma.cc/29R3-KF2N].
189. Lydia Smith, Poland abortion ban: Thousands of women take to streets across
country to demand reproductive rights, INDEPENDENT (July 6, 2018, 2:15 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-women-abortion-ban-march-strikeprotest-reproductive-rights-polish-government-latest-a8163281.html [https://perma.cc/FD6APBQJ].
190. Agnieszka Bielecka, Poland No Friend to Women, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 6,
2018, 2:27 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/03/poland-no-friend-women [https://
perma.cc/A3NU-83GD].
191. Police target Opposition politicians and NGO activists, HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS (July 6, 2018, 2:30 PM), www.hfhr.pl/en/police-target-opposition-politiciansand-ngo-activists/ [https://perma.cc/4D4B-UYDW].
192. EUR. PARL. DOC. (P8_TA 2017/0442) (2017), para. 18; Rule of law and democracy
in Poland at risk: Parliament ready for next steps, EUR. PARL. (July 6, 2018, 2:35 PM),
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20171110IPR87824/rule-of-law-anddemocracy-in-poland-at-risk-parliament-ready-for-next-steps [https://perma.cc/6CGJ-MCK4].
193. Supra notes 137-56 and accompanying text.
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2. Nongovernmental and International Organization
Over the two years this Article was in process, many reports and
statements by nongovernmental and international organizations reacted
to the torrent of legislative change by the post-2015 Polish government,
actions by the government’s political leaders, and changes the
government’s new appointees in the judicial system started to take.194
Some significant NGO reports are mentioned in the text, but the list is
not comprehensive. 195 The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights
(“HFHR”) in Poland submitted a thirty-three-page report on justice
system issues during the October 2017 visit of the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. 196 Also in
October 2017, Human Rights Watch published Eroding Checks and
Balances: Rule of Law and Human Rights Under Attack in Poland.197
Amnesty International submitted Poland: Dismantling Rule of Law? to
the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review in
April/May 2017. 198 As the title suggests, Human Rights First’s August
2017 report, Poland’s New Front: A Government’s War Against Civil
Society, focused in large part on actions regarding nongovernmental
194. See, e.g., Mikołaj Pietrzak, The Foundation for Law, Justice & Society, The
Constitutional Court of Poland: The Battle for Judicial Independence (2017),
https://www.fljs.org/sites/www.fljs.org/files/publications/The%20Constitutional%20Court%20
of%20Poland.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE78-AP6B] (describing new laws on public media,
surveillance and antiterrorism, and “reorganization” of the prosecution system, which a
neutering of the Constitutional Tribunal permitted); examples cited in supra notes 184-192 and
accompanying text; Sadurski, supra note 9, at 49-55 (right of assembly, freedom of speech,
counter-terrorism measures, electoral law)..
195. In addition to the reports mentioned in the text, see, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 187; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JUSTICE PURGED: POLAND POLITICIZES ITS JUDICIARY
(June 2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/justice-purged-poland-politicizes-itsjudiciary [https://perma.cc/Q3NS-H497]; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLAND: UPDATE ON
THE “REFORM” OF THE JUDICIARY, (Dec. 6, 2018) https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
eur37/9457/2018/en/ [https://perma.cc/9VND-3UQ2].
196. HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN POLAND:
ATTACKS ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL (2017), available
at http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HFHR_independence-of-justicesystem_October-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JYD-5PB6]; supra note 74 (report of the Special
Rapporteur’s visit).
197. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ERODING CHECKS AND BALANCES: RULE OF LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK IN POLAND (2017), available at https://www.hrw.org/report/
2017/10/24/eroding-checks-and-balances/rule-law-and-human-rights-under-attack-poland
[https://perma.cc/BBW9-MKE8].
198. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLAND, DISMANTLING RULE OF LAW? AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL SUBMISSION FOR THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW—27TH SESSION OF
THE UPR WORKING GROUP, APRIL/MAY 2017, available at https://www.amnesty.org/
en/documents/eur37/5069/2016/en/ [https://perma.cc/T6FJ-44S2].
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organizations, in what the report describes as a “slide toward . . .
illiberalism,” in the “dismantl[ing] of the country’s Constitutional
Tribunal, ensuring that it is unable to check the power of the executive
or legislature” as well as referring to other actions with regard to the
justice system. 199 The Stefan Batory Foundation issued a number of
reports including a May 2018 report titled Where the law ends—The
collapse of rule of law in Poland—and what to do, 200 Report of the
Stefan Batory Foundation Legal Expert Group on the impact of the
judiciary reform in Poland in 2015-18, 201 and Devastation of Poland’s
Supreme Court and judicial independence: the situation now. 202
Poland is prominently featured in Freedom House’s report, Nations in
Transit 2018, Confronting Illiberalism. 203 Freedom House’s annual
country reports, including their annual Democracy Score rating,
featured concerns about the judiciary, and Freedom House also
published Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s
Courts. 204
The European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (“ENCJ”)
issued numerous statements calling on the Polish executive and
parliament to reconsider legislation the ENCJ deems would bring the
Polish judiciary under the control of the political branches of

199. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, POLAND’S NEW FRONT: A GOVERNMENT’S WAR AGAINST
CIVIL SOCIETY (2017), available at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/
Poland-Report-August-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW9L-FMFS].
200. STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION, supra note 81.
201. STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION LEGAL EXPORT GROUP, REPORT OF THE STEFAN
BATORY FOUNDATION LEGAL EXPERT GROUP ON THE IMPACT OF THE JUDICIARY REFORM IN
POLAND IN 2015-2018 (2018), available at http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%
20operacyjne/Odpowiedzialne%20Panstwo/Batory%20Foundation_Report%20on%20the%20
judiciary%20reform%20in%20Poland.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6Q2-LZ75]. Co-Author Zoll is a
member of the legal experts group.
202. MARIA EJCHART-DUBOIS, ET AL., STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION, DEVASTATION
OF POLAND’S SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE SITUATION NOW (2018),
available at http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/
Devastation%20of%20PL%20Supreme%20Court.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7C8-LV99].
203. NATE SCHENKKAN, FREEDOM HOUSE, NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2018: CONFRONTING
ILLBERALISM (2018), available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nationstransit-2018#key-findings. [https://perma.cc/W5WR-C9TF].
204. ANNA WÓJCIK, FREEDOM HOUSE, POLAND (2018), available at https://
freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/poland
[https://perma.cc/5J6C-8HSX];
CHRISTIAN DAVIES, FREEDOM HOUSE, HOSTILE TAKEOVER: HOW LAW AND JUSTICE
CAPTURED POLAND’S COURTS (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/hostiletakeover-how-law-and-justice-captured-poland-s-courts [https://perma.cc/82NQ-SGX9].
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government. 205 On September 17, 2018, the ENCJ General Assembly
suspended the Polish National Judicial Council (the Polish acronym
being KRS) from the ENCJ, saying that the KRS could no longer fulfil
the requirement that ENCJ members be “independent of the executive
and legislation and ensure the final responsibility for the support of the
judiciary in the independent delivery of justice.” 206
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers visited Poland on October 23-27, 2017, after which he issued
a preliminary statement. 207 His official report was made to the UN
Human Rights Council on June 25, 2018. Subsection II.B.1 cites a
number of his factual findings. He termed Poland’s efforts to reform
the judiciary as “planning a clear out of senior judges to be replaced by
magistrates recommended by a council of mostly political appointees
of the current ruling majority.” 208
Responding to 2016 and 2017 changes in Polish law regarding the
judiciary, GRECO commenced a Rule 34 ad hoc procedure to consider
whether Poland is in serious violation of GRECO’s anti-corruption
standards governing member states. 209 In March 2018, GRECO
adopted an ad hoc Report with recommendations and sent an on-site
evaluation team to Poland on May 15-16, 2018. 210 That visit culminated
in adoption of a June 2018 Addendum to Poland’s 2012 Fourth
Evaluative Report on compliance with GRECO membership
standards. 211 Subsection I.B.1 of this Article cites a number of factual
205. ENCJ Position Paper, supra note 178, at point 3 (“General Assembly and the Board
of the ENCJ time and again made statements about the then draft law concerning the KRS . . .
.”); EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, POSITION PAPER OF THE BOARD
OF THE ENCJ ON THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE KRS OF POLAND para. 3 (2018), available
at https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017p/News/ENCJ%20Board%20position%20paper%20on%20KRS%20Poland.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DFT8-F2EA].
206. EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, ENCJ Suspends Polish
National Judicial Council - KRS, https://www.encj.eu/node/495 [https://perma.cc/2ZML3SHD].
207. Diego García-Sayán, Preliminary observations on the official visit to Poland: United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, OFF. OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. (Oct. 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22313&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/3XF7-YAEG].
208. Poland: Reforms a Serious Blow to Judicial Independence, SCOOP (June 26, 2018),
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1806/S00138/poland-reforms-a-serious-blow-to-judicialindependence.htm [https://perma.cc/72QZ-775D].
209. GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at paras. 2-8.
210. Id. at para. 7.
211. Id. at paras. 7, 9.
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findings from the March and June GRECO documents. The June
GRECO resolution directs Polish authorities to respond by March 31,
2019 to items deemed problematic under GRECO’s anti-corruption
system, which include the following. 212 The new NJC composition
does not meet the GRECO standard that half of the members be judges
appointed by their peers. 213 With regard to the Polish Supreme court,
the new extraordinary appeals and disciplinary chambers of the Polish
Supreme Court should be reconsidered; the executive should reduce
involvement in the court’s organization; and the new retirement age
should not be applied to sitting judges. 214 GRECO expressed concerns
about new disciplinary procedures for both supreme and ordinary court
judges that allow for the undue influence from the political branches.215
GRECO also raised undue influence of the executive on appointments
of the presidents and vice-presidents of the ordinary courts. 216
The European Commission for Democracy through Law
(commonly called the Venice Commission) is the Council of Europe’s
advisory body on constitutional matters. 217 The Venice Commission
issued opinions on Polish legislation in the five areas that were
necessary to take political control of the judicial system: the
Constitutional Tribunal, 218 the Public Prosecutor’s office, 219 the
National Council of the Judiciary, 220 the Supreme Court, 221 and the
Ordinary Courts. 222 These Venice Commission Opinions are cited
212. Id. at paras. 57-58.
213. Id. at para. 57, subpart i.
214. Id. at para. 57, subpart ii.
215. Id. at para. 57, subpart iii.
216. Id. at para. 57, subparts iv, v, and vi.
217. See THE VENICE COMM’N OF THE COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 94.
218. European Commission for Democracy through Law (VENICE Commission),
Opinion 833/2015 on the Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session, CDL-AD(2016)001. (March
11-12, 2016); European Commission for Democracy through Law (VENICE Commission),
Opinion 860/2016 on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal adopted by the Venice Commission
at its 108th Plenary Session, CDL-AD(2016)026. (Oct. 14-15, 2016).
219. European Commission for Democracy through Law (VENICE Commission),
Opinion 892/2017 on the Public Prosecutor’s Office as Amended adopted by the Venice
Commission at its 113th Plenary Session, CDL-AD(2017)028, December 8-9 2017.
220. European Commission for Democracy through Law (VENICE Commission),
Opinion 904/2017 on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary;
on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland;
and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, adopted by the Venice Commission at
its 113th Plenary Session, CDL-AD(2017)031, (Dec. 8-9, 2017).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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repeatedly in the GRECO and UN Special Rapporteur reports, by the
European Parliament and European Commission, and in many of the
analyses by nongovernmental and other international organizations.
The Venice Commission’s December 11, 2017 Opinion 904 regarding
changes to the National Judiciary Council, Supreme Court, and
Ordinary Courts referred five times to similarities to Soviet systems of
justice. 223
The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Resolution
2188 passed on October 11, 2017. The resolution identifies Poland as
one of five countries presenting examples of a “new threat to the rule
of law,” citing particularly the judiciary’s independence, the
amendments to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary,
concerns regarding the law on ordinary courts, and failure to implement
the Venice Commission’s recommendations with regard to the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal.
The European Parliament’s November 2017 resolution also cited
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (“OSCE/ODIHR”)
opinions on Polish draft laws regarding the judiciary from May 5,
2017 224 and August 30, 2017, 225 the UN Human Rights Committee
report on October 31, 2016, 226 and Canada’s intervention on May 9,
2017 at the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review of
Poland. 227

223. Point cited in WHERE THE LAW ENDS, supra note 81 at 13; VENICE Commission
Opinion 904/2017, at paras. 54 (similarity to Soviet system allowing opening of past final
judgments), 59 (allowing reopening of past judgments without notifying the parties), 61
(deeming possibility of reversal of old, final judgments worse than the Soviet system), 67 (on
lay members to judicial panels), and 89 (on the irony that “reforms” characterized as a “decommunization” have so many resemblances to the Soviet system).
224. OSCE OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Final Opinion
on Draft Amendments to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and Certain Other
Acts of Poland (Opinion-Nr.: JUD-POL/305/2017-Final [AlC/YM]) (May 5, 2017).
225. OSCE OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Opinion on
Certain Provisions of the Draft Act on the Supreme Court of Poland (Opinion-Nr.: JUDPOL/313/2017 [AlC]) (Nov. 13, 2017).
226. Seventh Periodic Rep. of the U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/POL/7
(Oct. 31, 2016).
227. EUR. PARL. DOC., supra note 192, at 4.
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3. Three EU Firsts: Invocation of EU Rule of Law Framework,
Article 7 Proceeding, and Proposal to Link EU Funding to Rule of
Law
In November 2014, the European Commission (“EC” or
“Commission”) adopted a new “Rule of Law Framework.” 228 The
Framework was adopted to fill a gap in EU remedies to “resolve future
threats to the rule of law” before a Member State’s situation reached
the level of a “‘clear risk of a serious breach’” of rule of law, which
TEU Article 2 lists as one of the common values upon which the EU
was founded. 229 TEU Article 7 is the TEU’s remedy for such a “‘clear
risk of a serious breach’” of Article 2 values and provides for a possible
sanction of suspension of a Member State’s EU rights including voting
in the European Council. 230 When the Commission adopted the 2014
Framework document, the TEU Article 7 had never been activated. 231
The Framework document notes that the Rule of Law procedure
is “without prejudice” to the Commission’s powers to launch an
infringement action under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (“TFEU”) to remedy specific situations where
a Member States’ law or practices are in violation of EU treaties. 232
The Rule of Law Framework and TEU Article 7, though, are addressed
to “systemic threat to rule of law” while an TFEU Article 258
infringement action are launched for a “breach of a specific provision
of EU law.” 233
228. Rule of law framework, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/
justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/rule-law/rule-law-framework_en (last visited
Jan. 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc/34FC-64CU]; EUR. PARL. RES. SERV., Briefing no. PE
573.922, Understanding the EU Rule of Law Mechanisms (2016), http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573922/EPRS_BRI(2016)573922_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QX3K-DZ9J].
229. Rule of law framework, supra note 228, at 3 and 6.; Version of the Treaty on European
Union, art. 2, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TEU].
230. TEU, art. 7.
231. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COLLEGE ORIENTATION DEBATE ON RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND AND THE RULE OF LAW FRAMEWORK: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
(2016), at 4.
232. Rule of law framework, supra note 228, at 3; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union art. 258, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter
TFEU]; Infringement procedure, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/lawmaking-process/applying-eu-law/infringement-procedure_en [https://perma.cc/8LU4-EUAR]
(last visited Fed. 4, 2019); European Commission, MEMO/12/12, Infringements: Frequently
Asked Questions,
EUROPEAN COMM’N (Jan. 17, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-12-12_en.htm [https://perma.cc/KLH4-QGAP].
233. Rule of law framework, supra note 228, at 3, 5-8.
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In January 2016, the European Commission (“EC” or
“Commission”) initiated the Rule of Law Framework for the first
time—regarding Poland. 234 Acting within the Framework, the EC made
Rule of Law Recommendations to Poland on July 27, 2017;235
December 21, 2016; 236 and July 27, 2016. 237 Finding the Polish
government’s response inadequate, the Commission issued a fourth
Rule of Law recommendation on December 20, 2017. 238 This time the
EC also submitted their Reasoned Proposal for a Decision of the
European Council under Article 7(1), the first triggering of the Article
7 proceeding in EU history. 239
An Article 7 proceeding can be triggered by a reasoned proposal
of the European Commission, European Parliament, or one third of the
Member States. 240 As the first such procedure, the process is somewhat
uncharted territory and does not come with specific rules and
timetables. 241
A 2016 European Parliament Briefing document
describes the EU as having chosen a “political” rather than “legal”

234. Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union
Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, COM (2017) 835 final (Dec. 20, 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=49108.
235. Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland Complementary
to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146, COM (2017) 5320 final
(July 27, 2017).
236. Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland Complementary
to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, COM (2016) 8950 final (Dec. 21, 2016).
237. Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, COM (2016)
5703 final (July 27, 2016).
238. Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland Complementary
to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146, and (EU) 2017/1520, COM
(2017) 9050 final (Dec. 20, 2017).
239. EC Reasoned Proposal, supra note 234.
240. TEU, supra note 229, at art. 7(1). The European Parliament apparently deferred to
the EC’s lead in triggering Article 7 with regard to Poland, Badowski, supra note 182. On March
1, 2018, the EP voted 422 in favor, 147 against, and 48 abstaining on a non-binding resolution
to support the EC’s action, see Eur. Parl. Press Release 20180226IPR98615, Rule of law in
Poland: Parliament supports EU action (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
news/en/press-room/20180226IPR98615/rule-of-law-in-poland-parliament-supports-eu-action
[https://perma.cc/W5WZ-QTR6]. On September 12, 2018, the EP triggered an Article 7
proceeding against Hungary, see European Parliament Press Release 20180906IPR12104, Rule
of law in Hungary: Parliament calls on the EU to act (Sept. 9, 2018), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180906IPR12104/rule-of-law-inhungary-parliament-calls-on-the-eu-to-act [https://perma.cc/U9RQ-Q6JU].
241. Eszter Zalan, EU action on Hungary and Poland drowns in procedure, EU
OBSERVER, (Nov. 13, 2018, 09:21 AM), https://euobserver.com/political/143359; Eszter Zalan,
EU ministers struggle to deal with Poland and Hungary, EU OBSERVER (Oct. 16, 2018, 5:18
PM), https://euobserver.com/justice/143122.
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approach with Article 7. 242 The General Affairs Council of the Council
of the European Union has held three formal hearings on the Article 7
proceeding against Poland. 243 The European Parliament Committee on
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs made a mission to Poland on
September 19-21, 2018 244 with a follow-up hearing on November 20,
2018 in Brussels. 245
On May 2, 2018, the European Commission presented a proposed
European Union budget for 2021-2027. 246 With the budget, the
Commission also proposed a regulation “on the protection of the
Union’s budget in case of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule
of law in the Member States.” 247 The budget proposal lists components
of a Member state’s legal system necessary for the EU to “protect its
budget,” assure “sound financial management,” and the “financial
interests of the Union.” 248 One of those is “effective review by
independent courts.” 249 The overall explanation for this priority is,
“Only an independent judiciary that upholds the rule of law and legal
certainty in all Member States can ultimately guarantee that money
242. EUR. PARL. RES. SERV., supra note 228, at 3.
243. General Affairs Council, EUROPEAN COUNCIL (June 26, 2018), https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2018/06/26/ [https://perma.cc/JWW9-5JH7 ]; General
Affairs Council, EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/meetings/gac/2018/09/18/ [https://perma.cc/26YC-WL38]; General Affairs Council,
EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/
gac/2018/12/11/ https://perma.cc/QUE9-8S5B].
244. EUR. PARL. COMM. ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS, Draft
Mission Report Following the Ad Hoc Delegation to Poland on the Situation of the Rule of Law,
September 19-21, 2018 (Nov. 19, 2018), EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Nov. 19, 2018),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/
plmrep/COMMITTEES/LIBE/DV/2018/12-03/mission_report_Poland_EN.pdf.
245. EUR. PARL. COMM. ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS, Draft
Agenda: Public Hearing on “The Situation of the Rule of Law in Poland, In Particular as
Regards the Independence of the Judiciary,” LIBE_OJ (2018) 1120 (Nov. 20, 2018), EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT (Nov. 20, 2018) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/
COMMITTEES/LIBE/DV/2018/11-19/Draftprogramme_hearing_rule_of_law_Poland_EN
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7AP-RZR6].
246. European Commission Press Release IP/18/3570, EU budget: Commission proposes
a modern budget for a Union that protects, empowers and defends (May 2, 2018), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3570_en.htm [https://perma.cc/P226-HL6J].
247. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regard the rule of law in
the Member States, Com (2018) 324 final (May 2, 2018).
248. EU Budget for the Future: Sound Financial Management and the Rule of Law,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 2, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/budget-proposals-financial-management-rule-law-may2018_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TE6-TNNW].
249. Id.
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from the EU budget is sufficiently protected.” 250 On January 17, 2019,
the European Parliament approved the proposed regulation by a vote of
394 in favor, 158 against, and 69 abstentions. 251 Final approval must
come from the Council. 252 European Union money has represented
more than sixty-one percent of Poland’s infrastructure spending, 253 and
currently Poland is the largest beneficiary of European Union funds,
receiving “some 14 billion euro annually.” 254 A January 2019 study by
the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and
Constitutional Affairs considers the various EU mechanisms available
to safeguard basic principles and values, reviews the Rule of Law
approaches taken with regard to Poland and Hungary, and makes
proposals for improving the protection of the rule of law in the EU. 255
4. Opening the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”)
Front
While the TEU Article 7 process and proposal to link EU budget
funds to rule of law proceed, the CJEU has become a center of action
regarding the Polish judiciary.
a. European Commission Article 258 Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union Infringement Proceedings
On the same day the Article 7 proceeding was launched, the
Commission broke new ground by bringing the CJEU the first Article
258 TFEU infringement proceeding based on a violation of Article
19(1) of the TEU read with Article 47 of the EU Charter of

250. Id.
251. Lili Bayer, European Parliament backs plan to link EU funds to rule of law, POLITICO
(Jan. 17, 2019, 7:33 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/budget-hungary-poland-rule-of-laweuropean-parliament-backs-plan-to-link-eu-funds/ [https://perma.cc/Y8LN-FHMQ].
252. EU Budget for the Future, supra note 248.
253. Steven Erlanger, As Poland and Hungary Flout Democratic Values, Europe Eyes the
Aid Spigot, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/world/
europe/poland-hungary-european-union-money.html.
254. Slawomir Sierakowski, The Beginning of the End for Poland’s Populists, N.Y.TIMES
(Nov. 6, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/opinion/the-beginning-of-the-end-forpolands-populists.html.
255. Eur. Parl., Policy Dep’t for Citizens’ Rights and Const. Affairs, The EU Framework
for Enforcing the Respect of the Rule of Law and the Union’s Fundamental Principles and
Values 31 (2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608856/IPOL_
STU(2019)608856_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN5A-HPYZ].
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Fundamental Rights. 256 This infringement action concerned the Polish
Law on Ordinary Courts Organisation, the expressed concern being
that giving the President discretionary power to extend the term of
judges who had reached retirement age endangered judicial
independence, which is a necessary element of a right to a fair trial.257
On July 2, 2018, the Commission launched its second TFEU
Article 258 infringement regarding judicial independence in Poland by
sending a Letter of Formal Notice to Poland regarding the twenty-seven
Supreme Court judges who faced retirement the following day. 258 On
October 2, 2018, the Commission brought the infringement action to
the CJEU requesting an interim ruling to suspend the legislation
lowering the Supreme Court retirement age with regard to sitting
judges, ensure that judges affected could continue to serve, restrain the
Polish government from appointing new judges, and order Poland to
inform the CJEU regarding compliance. 259 The Commission’s
infringement petition asserted that the new law taking effect July 3
violated the principle of judicial independence, including the
“irremovability” of judges, and Poland’s obligations under Article
19(1) of the TEU read with Article 47 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, which establishes member states’ obligations
regarding fair trials.” 260 The Commission’s fall 2018 infringement
action concerned lowering the retirement age for sitting judges and the
same kind of Presidential discretion power to extend the term that was

256. European Commission Press Release IP/17/5367, Rule of Law: European
Commission Acts to Defend Judicial Independence in Poland (Dec. 20, 2017),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.pdf; Dimitry Kochenov, Laurent Pech, &
Kim Lane Scheppele, The European Commission’s Activation of Article 7: Better Late than
Never, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Dec. 23, 2017), https://verfassungsblog.de/the-europeancommissions-activation-of-article-7-better-late-than-never/ (asserting this as the first claim of
this kind given that this combination was raised in a December 2015 action against Hungary but
dropped before reaching the CJEU).
257. Case C-192/18, Eur. Comm’n v Republic of Poland, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-192/18 (Mar. 15, 2018).
258. European Commission Press Release IP/18/4341, Rule of Law: Commission
Launches Infringement Procedure to Protect the Independence of the Polish Supreme Court
(July 2, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4341_en.htm.
259. Case C-619/18, Eur. Comm’n v Republic of Poland 2018, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-192/18 (Mar. 15, 2018); European Commission Press
Release IP/18/5830, Rule of Law: European Commission Refers Poland to the European Court
of Justice to Protect the Independence of the Polish Supreme Court (Sept. 24, 2018),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_I P-18-5830_en.htm [https://perma.cc/5WY7-K9TD].
260. Id.
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the basis of the first infringement action with regard to the Ordinary
Courts.
On October 19, 2018 the Vice President of the CJEU
provisionally granted the European Commission’s prayers for relief in
the infringement action pending an order on the interim proceedings. 261
On November 16, 2018, the CJEU President ordered that the matter be
determined under the CJEU’s expedited procedures. 262 Following an
oral argument on November 16, on December 17, 2018 the CJEU
Grand Chamber adopted the reasoning of the October 2018 Vice
President’s decision and ordered the Polish government to suspend the
pertinent provisions of Polish law, take “all necessary measures” to
assure the affected judges could perform as they had prior to April 3,
2018, refrain from appointing judges to fill the relevant positions
including that of the office of First President, and notify the European
Commission within one month and at regular intervals after about
compliance. 263
In response to the Commission’s moves on infringement, a senior
Polish government official said Poland might ignore a ruling of the
CJEU. 264 Despite the pending CJEU infringement action, on October
10, 2018, Poland’s President swore in twenty-seven new Supreme
Court judges. 265 On October 24, 2018, PiS Party leader Jarosław
261. Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 159/18, Poland must
immediately suspend the application of the provisions of national legislation relating to the
lowering of the retirement age for Supreme Court judges (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-10/cp180159en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KUU8-TEYF].
262. Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 204/18, Poland Must
Immediately Suspend the Application of the Provisions of National Relating to the Lowering
of
the
Retirement
Age
for
Supreme
Court
Judges (Dec.
17,
2018),
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_1534878/en/; Case C-619/18, Eur. Comm’n v Republic of
Poland, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209302&pageIndex
=0&doclang=PL&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11865245 (Dec. 17, 2018).
263. Case
C-619/18,
Eur.
Comm’n
v
Republic
of
Poland
2018,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-619/18%20R (Dec. 17, 2018);
European Commission Press Release IP/18/5830, Rule of Law: European Commission Refers
Poland to the European Court of Justice to Protect the Independence of the Polish Supreme Court
(Sept.
24,
2018),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5830_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/5WY7-K9TD].
264. Alexandra Brzozowski, Poland threatens to ignore rulings of EU’s top court,
EURACTIV (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/polandthreatens-to-ignore-rulings-of-eus-top-court/ [https://perma.cc/SUC6-LP67].
265. Monika Ścisłowska, Polish leader appoints top court judges, against ruling, AP
NEWS,
(Oct.
10,
2018),
https://apnews.com/72f55291a715434bb2e32707f3c0ede9
[https://perma.cc/76G7-8HP8].
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Kaczyński said Poland would fight the October 19 CJEU order. 266 Just
the day before, CJEU President Koen Lenaerts told journalists that
refusal to comply with an EU order puts the country “outside the legal
order.” 267 Perhaps because of the PiS party’s poor showing in urban
areas in the local elections in October and November 2018, 268 on
November 21, 2018, the Polish government reversed course with the
Sejm’s passage of legislation nullifying the forced retirement for
Supreme Court judges. 269 After passage, by the Polish Senate,
President Duda signed the bill into law on December 10, 2018.270
Poland now asserts that the infringement action should be dropped
because Polish law is in compliance. 271 The European Commission and
at least four Member States argue that the questions of European treaty
law involved should still be decided. 272

266. Marek Strzelecki & Stephanie Bodoni, No Polish Wiggle Room on Judges as EU
Court Chief Spells Out Law, BLOOMBERG (Oct 24, 2016, 6:46 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-24/poland-delays-moves-in-eu-court-rowtill-after-election-run-off.
267. Id.
268. Slawomir Sierakowski, The Beginning of the End for Poland’s Populists, N.Y.TIMES,
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/opinion/the-beginning-of-the-end-forpolands-populists.html (scope of election defeat, reporting 80% of Poles support European
integration, the highest in Europe); Vanessa Gera, Major Setback for Poland’s Ruling Populists
in Mayoral Races, AP NEWS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/
27508bc038e54ed281034d022eb00020 [https://perma.cc/YK8Y-PLRM].
269. Vanessa Gera, Poland moves to reinstate retired judges to Supreme Court, AP NEWS,
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/9e4251bb43c8422ab1f0bb4d0fb7eea2 [https://
perma.cc/J2NU-3CVX].
270. Joanna Berendt & Marc Santora, Poland Reverses Supreme Court Purge, Retreating
from Conflict with E.U., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/12/17/world/europe/poland-supreme-court.html.
271. Maciej Deja, Wraca sprawa polska w TSUE. Rząd przekazał raport Komisji [The
Polish CJEU case. The government has forwarded the report to the Commission], WP
WIADOMOŚCI (Jan. 17, 2019), https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/wraca-sprawa-polska-w-tsue-rzadprzekazal-raport-komisji-6339487785006721a?amp=1; see infra note 272.
272. Łukasz Woźnicki, Cztery unijne kraje przeciw czystce w polskim Sądzie Najwyższym
[Four EU countries against purges in the Polish Supreme Court], WYBORCZA.PL, (Jan. 4, 2019,
7:12
PM)
http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24333404,cztery-unijne-kraje-przeciw-czystce-wpolskim-sadzie-najwyzszym.html. Just as this article was going to press, on February 12, 2019,
the CJEU held a hearing on the Commission’s infringement action on the Supreme Court
retirements with an announcement that the Advocate General would reach a decision regarding
the final ruling in this case by April 11, 2018 with the decision by the CJEU 15-member Grand
Chamber by the end of April or May, infra note 297.
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b. Article 267 TFEU Requests for Preliminary Rulings on
Interpretation of EU Treaties as Necessary to Decide Matters in
National Courts
In March 2018, Irish High Court Justice Aileen Donnelly stayed
the extradition of Artur Celmer, a Polish national accused of drug
trafficking, questioning whether independence of the Polish judiciary
had so deteriorated that it threatened the mutual trust and recognition
among EU jurisdictions upon which the European Arrest Warrant
system rests. 273 She ruled that guidance was needed from the CJEU.274
Hence, she made a request for preliminary ruling under Article 267 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which permits a
Member State court to request a CJEU ruling on the interpretation of
EU treaties and acts where such guidance may be necessary to make a
decision in the national court. 275 Justice Donnelly’s ruling cited the
European Commission’s Reasoned Proposal triggering the Article 7
proceeding 276 and opinions of the Venice Commission on Polish legal
reforms, 277 saying these may, “taken as a whole, breach the common
value of the rule of law referred to in Article 2 TEU.” 278 Attacks on
Justice Donnelly for her sexual orientation by conservative Polish
press 279 drew swift condemnation from the Association of Judges of
Ireland. 280
273. Extradition to Poland Case Comes Back Before Judge, THE IRISH TIMES (Mar. 16,
2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/extradition-to-poland-casecomes-back-before-judge-1.3428657 [https://perma.cc/L23P-HZSE]; Extraditions to Poland
May Be Suspended EU-Wide, Lawyers Say, THE IRISH TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/extraditions-to-poland-may-be-suspendedeu-wide-lawyers-say-1.3425284 [https://perma.cc/Q2FL-747J].
274. Id.
275. TFEU, supra note 232, art. 267; EUR. PARL. RES. SERV., Briefing no. PE
608.628, Preliminary Reference Procedure (2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/BRIE/2017/608628/EPRS_BRI(2017)608628_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WM5-44K8].
276. Case C-216/18, Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM (Deficiencies in the System
of Justice), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-216/18%20PPU (June
28), [https://perma.cc/LZ9T-5P2C].
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Polish Right-Wingers Focus Ire on “Irish Lesbian Judge,” THE IRISH TIMES (Mar.
14, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/polish-right-wingersfocus-ire-on-irish-lesbian-judge-1.3427114 [https://perma.cc/8QHU-2LBQ].
280. Judges Condemn “Personalised Attacks and Invective” by Polish Media, THE IRISH
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018, 10:55 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/judgescondemn-personalised-attacks-and-invective-by-polish-media-1.3428170
[https://perma.cc/
CWZ7-PGZA].
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On June 28, 2018, the Advocate General of the Court of Justice
of the European Union delivered the CJEU opinion ruling that, to deny
extradition, a court must find a real risk of flagrant denial of justice to
the particular person involved on account of deficiencies in the system
of justice of the Member State requesting extradition. 281 On July 25,
2018, the Court (Grand Chamber of the CJEU) handed down its
decision following the Advocate General’s reasoning in her June 28
decision. 282 The Grand Chamber acknowledged the Irish court’s
awareness of
“material, such as that set out in the reasoned proposal of the
European Commission adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU,
indicating that there is a real risk of breach of the fundamental right
to a fair trial guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on
account of systematic or generalised deficiencies so far as
concerns the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary
. . .” 283

The Court then ruled that, to make a decision on executing the Polish
arrest warrant, the Irish court must “determine, specifically and
precisely,” whether the person in question will run a risk of denial of a
fair trial if surrendered to Poland. 284
To make the individual assessment required by the CJEU ruling,
Justice Donnelly sought assurances with regard to Mr. Celmer’s ability
to get a fair trial based on “Poland’s deputy justice minister [having
been] quoted as calling him a ‘dangerous criminal’ connected to a
‘drugs mafia’, despite the presumption of innocence.” 285 Judge Joanna
Bitner, the President of the Warsaw Regional Court, who had been
appointed to the position in the Minister of Justice’s recent round of
replacements of court presidents, replied “‘any and all such statements’
by politicians and the media were ‘absolutely irrelevant’ and had no
impact on a judge’s decision making process and that Polish judges
281. Deficiencies in the System of Justice Case, supra note 278.
282. Case C-216/18, Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM (Deficiencies in the System
of
Justice), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=204384&page
Index=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11867445 (July 25, 2018).
283. Id. at para. 79.
284. Id. at para. 34.
285. Ruaidhrí Giblin, Supreme Court to decide on extradition of wanted Polish man, THE
IRISH TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-andw/courts/supreme-court-to-decide-on-extradition-of-wanted-polish-man-1.3726503
[https://perma.cc/9ETV-RDA9].
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“were independent and subject only to the Polish constitution and
laws.” 286 The original trial judge, Piotr Gąciarek, however, wrote to the
High Court that “it was ‘not true’ for his superior to have said the
independence of judges and courts in Poland was not presently at risk”
but rather that laws of the last three years and their operation by
“‘politicians currently in power’ posed ‘very serious threats’ to the
Polish justice system.” 287
On November 28, 2018, Justice Donnelly ruled that Mr. Celmer
could be surrendered but also said there was “at least the possibility of
‘another view prevailing,’” stayed her order, and suggested that the
matter should be decided in a “ ‘leapfrog’ appeal” to the Irish Supreme
Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal. 288 The Irish Court of Appeal
President, supported by the Irish Ministry of Justice, permitted the
direct appeal to the Irish Supreme Court” where the matter will be
heard. 289 On January 4, 2019, a Dutch court decided to temporarily
suspend extradition of eleven people with Polish European arrest
warrants. 290 The court’s statement said that it found the answers to
questions the Dutch courts had proffered to Polish courts seeking
extradition regarding independence of the Polish judiciary and
consequences for the rights of the particular suspects to thus far be
“incomplete or requiring further questions.” 291
Since institution of the Irish case, Polish courts have sent at least
nine Article 267 request for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. 292 In
August 2018, a seven-member panel of Polish Supreme Court judges

286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Ruaidhrí Giblin, High Court Permits Appeal Against Decision to Extradite a Man to
Poland, IRISH EXAMINER (Nov. 28, 2018), 5:13PM), https://www.irishexaminer.com/
breakingnews/ireland/high-court-permits-appeal-against-decision-to-extradite-man-to-poland888566.html [https://perma.cc/VU6K-ELCA].
289. Giblin, supra note 285.
290. Holenderski sąd: nie będzie ekstradycji do Polski, niezależność sądów zagrożona
[Dutch Court: There will be no extradition to Poland, the independence of the courts is at stake],
NIEDZIELA, NL (Jan. 6, 2019), http://www.niedziela.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=19162:2019-01-06-10-03-15&catid=77:h [https://perma.cc/9EJR-R4ZB].
291. Id.
292. Seven of those cases are discussed below. Two additional Article 267 requests raise
issues related to cases discussed. Case C-537/18, Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-537/18 (Aug. 17, 2018); Case C623/18, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słubicach, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=
en&num=C-623/18 (Oct. 3, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EV24-2JPJ].
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referred five questions to the CJEU. 293 The referring judges raised
whether the new Supreme court retirement law was consistent with
Articles 2, 4, and 19 of the TEU and Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as well as a Council
Directive regarding equal treatment in employment. 294 Two of the
judges on adjudicating panels would be affected by the new
provisions. 295 The panel suspended the pertinent provisions, and two
of the questions to the CJEU concerned the national court’s obligation
to apply them if doing so would violate EU law. 296
This case was set for argument in the CJEU on February 12, 2019
but was removed from the CJEU calendar. 297 The Polish government’s
repeal of the retirement provisions with regard to sitting judges was
described previously in the Subsection on the European Commission’s
Article 258 infringement action with regard to them. 298 The Polish press
reports that, in early January 2019, the CJEU requested the Polish
Supreme Court to respond by January 28 as to whether the Court still
thinks it necessary for the CJEU to respond to the referral for
preliminary ruling in this matter. 299 Terminating the August 2018
Article 267 preliminary ruling, however, would not in itself dispose of
293. Case C-522/18, DŚ v. Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Jaśle, Request
for a Preliminary Ruling, (Aug. 9, 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/
?uri=CELEX:62018CN0522&from=EN [https://perma.cc/4Q7Q-FXWT].
294. Id.
295. Case C-522/18, DŚ v. Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Jaśle, Request
for a Preliminary Ruling, Order of the President of the Court, paras. 6-7 (Sept. 26,
2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=206423&pageIndex=
0&doclang=PL&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11869258.
296. Id. at para. 14.
297. TSUE odwołał rozprawę w sprawie pytań prejudycjalnych Sądu Najwyższego, [The
CJEU cancels the hearing on the Supreme Court’s request for ruling on preliminary questions]
POLSKIE RADIO.PL, (Jan. 15 2019, 1:16 PM), https://www.polskieradio.pl/5/1223/
Artykul/2246394,TSUE-odwolal-rozprawe-w-sprawie-pytan-prejudycjalnych-SaduNajwyzszego [https://perma.cc/J2YZ-YP9U]. Argument on the European Commission’s
Article 258 infringement matter regarding the Supreme Court was argued on February 12, 2019
instead, see supra notes 258-272 and accompanying text. An opinion by the CJEU’s Advocate
General in that case is expected on April 11, 2019 with the final ruling by the CJEU 15-member
Grand Chamber by the end of April or May. Tomasz Bielecki, Po rozprawie w TSUE. Skutek
uboczny sporu o Sąd Najwyższy? KRS też idzie pod lupę [After the CJEU Hearing. A side effect
of the Supreme Court dispute? The NJC goes under the microscope], WYBORCZA.PL (Feb. 12,
2019, 2:38 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75399,24451612,po-rozprawie-w-tsue-skutek-ubocznysporu-o-sad-najwyzszy-krs.html [https://perma.cc/EXJ9-EZXG] (argument in Article 258
infringement matter also raised whether the NJC in its current form can protect judicial
independence).
298. Supra notes 264-272 and accompanying text.
299. POLSKIE RADIO, supra note 297.
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the Article 258 infringement case brought by the European
Commission. 300 Belgium, the Netherlands, Latvia, and Denmark filed
comments saying the Article 267 matter should still be decided by the
CJEU. 301
In other Article 267 matters, two judges from the ordinary courts
raised whether the new disciplinary court structure and procedure
raised threats to judicial independence for judges ruling in cases where
the government is a party given the nature of the new disciplinary
procedure that the government has created .302 While their request for
a temporary ruling was denied on October 1, 2018 with regard to the
standards for expedited ruling, the October decision did not address the
substantive questions presented and are still pending in the CJEU. 303
In three additional cases, the Polish Supreme Court questioned
whether the legitimacy of the newly-constituted National Judiciary
Council and judges appointed by it must be decided before they could
hear the matters before them. 304 One of the cases was brought by a
Supreme Administrative Court judge who had sought extension of
retirement at 65, received a negative opinion from the NJC, and argued
he should retain the right to appeal to the Labor Chamber of the
Supreme Court as prior law had provided. 305 Under new law, appeal
would go to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court with
newly-appointed judges closely linked to the Minster of Justice. 306 The
300. Piotr Bogdanowicz and Maciej Taborowski, Why the EU Commission and the Polish
Supreme Court Should not Withdraw their Cases from Luxembourg, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Dec.
3, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/why-the-eu-commission-and-the-polish-supreme-courtshould-not-withdraw-their-cases-from-luxembourg/ [https://perma.cc/C86Y-3QTK].
301. Łukasz Woźnicki, Cztery unijne kraje przeciw czystce w polskim Sądzie Najwyższym,
[Four EU countries against purges in the Polish Supreme Court], WYBORCZA.PL (Jan. 4, 2019,
7:12
PM),
http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24333404,cztery-unijne-kraje-przeciw-czystce-wpolskim-sadzie-najwyzszym.html [https://perma.cc/BDC3-NSR7].
302. C-558/18
Sąd
odsyłający:
Sąd
Okręgowy
w
Łodzi,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-558/18 (Sept. 3, 2018); C-563/18
Prokuratura Okręgowa w Płocku from Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie w VIII Wydziale Karnym
składzie, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-563/18 (Sept. 5, 2018).
303. C-558/18 Sąd odsyłający: Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi.
304. Case C-585/18, Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-585/18
(Nov.
26,
2018);
Case
C-624/18,
CP,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-624/18 (Jan. 18, 2019); Case C625/18, DO, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-625/18 (Jan. 18, 2019).
In Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, Procedure in Accelerated Mode,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?docid=208542&text=&dir=&doclan
g=PL&part=1&occ=first&mode=req&pageIndex=0&cid=61%E2%80%A6 (Nov. 26, 2018).
305. See Joined Cases, para. 6.
306. Id., para. 13.
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other two appeals were from Supreme Court judges facing retirement
at 65.307 They argued that the new NJC is no longer performing its
constitutional function to safeguard judicial independence and that a
court with judges recommended by the new NJC is not an independent
court as required by European law. 308 Hence, these two judges contend,
that they should retain their right to appeal their employment status to
the Polish Supreme Court. In a November 26, 2018 Order, the CJEU
President ruled that the three joined cases would be heard under the
CJEU’s accelerated procedure. 309 These cases are reported to be
scheduled for hearing on March 19, 2019. 310
In November 2018, the Polish Supreme Administrative Court also
sent an Article 267 request to the CJEU regarding the claims of Polish
Supreme Court applicants who were turned down with no reasons
given. 311 Current law gives provides no specifics on the process and
criteria for judicial selection and no right to appeal to rejected
candidates.

307. Id., para. 7.
308. Id., paras. 10-11.
309. Id., un-numbered Ruling paragraph.
310. Łukasz Woźnicki, TSUE rozbroi izbę dyscyplinarną i KRS? Rozprawa w marcu
[CJEU will disarm the disciplinary chamber and the National Judiciary Council? Argument in
March], WYBORCZA.PL (Dec. 13, 2018, 2:09 PM) http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24274415,tsuerozbroi-izbe-dyscyplinarna-i-krs-rozprawa-w-marcu.html [https://perma.cc/BF6B-ADF2].
311. Case
C-824/18,
Krajowa
Rada
Sądownictwa
(Dec.
28,
2018),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-824/18; Komunikat w sprawie
postanowienia NSA dotyczącego przedstawienia pytań prejudycjalnych do Trybunału
Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej (sygn. akt II GOK 2/18) [Announcement regarding the
Supreme Administrative Court’s decision to submit questions for a preliminary ruling to the
Court of Justice of the European Union (file reference II GOK 2/18)], (Nov. 21, 2018),
http://www.nsa.gov.pl/komunikaty/komunikat-w-sprawie-postanowienia-nsa-dotyczacegoprzedstawienia-pytan-prejudycjalnych-do-trybunalu-sprawiedliwosci-unii-europejskiej-sygnakt-ii-gok-2-18,news,4,601.php; 1SA/Bk 37/09-Wyrok WSA w Białymstoku z 2009-02-25
37/09 http://orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl/doc/E3FAD68B4C; NSA skierował do TSUE pytania
prejudycjalne ws. wyłaniania sędziów SN [The Supreme Administrative Court referred questions
to the CJEU regarding appointment of judges of the Supreme Court], GAZETA PRAWNA.PL
(Nov. 22, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1360451,nsa-skierowal-dotsue-pytania-prejudycjalne-ws-wylaniania-sedziow-sn.html; NSA wchodzi do gry. Pyta
Trybunał Sprawiedliwości UE o KRS [AKTUALIZOWANY] [The Supreme Administrative Court
comes into play asking the CJEU about the National Judiciary Council] OKO.PRESS (Nov. 22,
2018),
https://oko.press/nsa-wchodzi-do-gry-pyta-trybunal-sprawiedliwosci-ue-o-krsaktualizowany/.
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5. Polexit?
In November 2018, Donald Tusk, Polish Prime Minister from
2007-2014 and now the President of the EU European Council, warned
that the quarreling between the European Union and Poland about the
judicial system could lead to “Poland stumbling out of the EU by
accident.” 312 The specter of de facto Polexit through actions with
regard to the court system has been raised in at least four contexts: the
previously-discussed enforcement of European arrest warrants;
Poland’s flirtation with refusing to comply with EU concerns on PiS’s
changes to the judicial system, most specifically the orders in the
infringement case on Supreme Court retirement; an action that Minister
of Justice Ziobro filed in the Constitutional Tribunal to declare that an
Article 267 CJEU preliminary ruling is not superior to a Polish court’s
finding on what is permitted by the Polish constitution regarding the
country’s judicial system; and another pending Constitutional Tribunal
matter filed by the National Judiciary Council to seek to ratify their
legitimacy.
The Irish and Dutch courts’ extradition concerns show the risk
that the Polish judiciary gradually will be excluded from the European
justice system. The CJEU’s Grand Chamber decision on December 17,
2018 regarding the European Commission infringement action refers
to the Irish Court’s Article 267 request for preliminary ruling as
supporting its decision that “the risk of losing confidence in the Polish
judiciary is not fictitious or hypothetical, but quite real.” 313 The arrest
warrant cases could impact the position of the Polish judicial system in
the courts of other EU member states, reaching far beyond extradition
cases. Some journalists, commenting on the CJEU ruling, suggested it
could be a first step in an informal Polexit—a departure of Poland from
the Western legal sphere. 314 Issues regarding the fairness and
312. James Shotter, Poland risks falling out of the EU by accident, warns Donald Tusk,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/e62f4ce4-e142-11e8-a6e5792428919cee [https://perma.cc/5SPE-YVV5].
313. Case C-619/18R, Eur. Comm’n v Republic of Poland, para. 77, http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-619/18%20R (Dec. 17, 2018).
314. Bartosz T. Wieliński, Odpowiedź Trybunału Sprawiedliwości ue udzielona
Irlandzkiej sędzi depotracyjnej oznacza, że Polska jest już kroczek poza Unią [The response of
the Court of Justice of the EU to the Irish judge means that Poland is already a step outside the
Union], WYBORCZA.PL (July 25, 2018), http://wyborcza.pl/7,7596823715417,odpowiedztrybunalu-sprawiedliwosci-udzielona-irlandzkiej.html [https://perma.cc/XV2W-RPZ4];
M.
Matczak: Polska w B-klasie praworządności – komentarz do wyroku TSUE w sprawie
CELMER [ Poland in the B Rule of the rule of law—a commentary to the CJUE Ruling in the
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independence of Polish courts, however, may now be raised in every
case involving recognition of a Polish judgment. 315 The CJEU’s
decision also provides arguments for the European Commission to use
in their pending Article 7 proceedings and consideration of linking
budget allocation to a Member State’s rule of law institutions.
As previously described, the Poland government initially
suggested it might not comply with an order in the Article 258 action
regarding the Polish Supreme Court retirement law. 316 This brought a
stern rebuke from the CJEU President that this would put Poland
outside the EU 317
In response to previously-described August 2018 Polish Supreme
Court requests to the CJEU Article 267 preliminary ruling on questions
related to the Polish Supreme Court Act, Minster of Justice (and
Prosecutor General) Ziobro filed an action with the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal on August 23, 2018 with an extension of the
original request on October 4, 2018. 318 His petition asked the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal to rule that it would be a violation of the Polish
Constitution to allow referral from a Polish court to the CJEU for
preliminary ruling on matters “pertaining to the design, shape, and
organisation of the judiciary as well as proceedings before the judicial
organs of a member state.” 319 A flurry of commentary referred to this
as another manifestation of Polexit from the EU legal system. 320

CELMER case], MONITOR KONSTYTUCYJNY (July 25, 2018), monitorkonstytucyjny.eu/
archiwa/5154 [https://perma.cc/7TUA-NDNQ].
315. Łukasz Rogojsz, Prof. Kruszyński o decyzji tsue:”To bardzo groźne dla Polskiego
wymiaru sprawiedliwości” [Prof. Kruszyński on the decision of the CJEU: “It is very dangerous
for the Polish judiciary”], GAZETA.PL (July 25, 2018, 2:54 PM). http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/
wiadomosci/7,114884,23715446,decyzja-tsue-oznacza-wystawienie-polski-poza-nawiaskultury.html [https://perma.cc/6P8G-59GZ].
316. See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
318. Majewski Kacper, Will Poland, With Its Own Constitution Ablaze, Now Set Fire to
EU Law?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Oct. 17, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/will-poland-withits-own-constitution-ablaze-now-set-fire-to-eu-law/, DOI: https://doi.org/10.17176/20181026150347-0 (citing p. 1 of the petition).
319. Id.
320. See, e.g., id.; Stanisław Biernat & Monika Kawczyńska, Though this be Madness,
yet there’s Method in’t: Pitting the Polish Constitutional Tribunal against the Luxembourg
Court, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Oct. 26, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/though-this-bemadness-yet-theres-method-int-the-application-of-the-prosecutor-general-to-the-polishconstitutional-tribunal-to-declare-the-preliminary-ruling-procedure-unconstitut/;
Tomasz
Pietryga, Ziobro odnawia lęki o polexit - komentuje Tomasz Pietryga [Ziobro renews fears
about polexit - comments Tomasz Pietryga], RZECZPOSPOLITA (Oct. 18, 2018, 10:08 AM),
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In October 2018, Stanisław Biernat, professor of European Law
and former Vice-President of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, listed
eight matters brought to the CT by PiS Members of Parliament or
Prosecutor General Ziobro as cases “artificially created” for
constititutional review to meet an immedate political need of the
government. 321 The National Judiciary Counsel’s November 27, 2018,
request for a ruling on their own constitutionality seems a case of this
type. 322 The Constitutional Tribunal’s current president set a panel for
the case and hearing date of January 3, 2019 within three days of the
matter’s filing. 323 Without explanation for the reason, however, the
hearing was cancelled and has not been rescheduled. 324 One speculated
reason is the Polish government’s fear of Polexit accusations in
attempting to preempt a CJEU on the conformity of the newlyconstituted NJC to EU treaty law. 325
D. Judicial System Reforms for Consideration within International
Rule of Law Norms
In a 2012 book chapter, Co-Author Zoll discussed the role that the
then recently-created Szkoła Sądownictwa i Prokuratury (School for
Judiciary and Prosecutors or “SSIP”) was established to play in
enhancing the quality and legitimacy of the Polish judicial system.326
His chapter considers where democratic legitimacy for judges in civil
law countries should lie, acknowledging that, as in Poland, today’s
judges often have considerable scope in interpreting the law, which
goes beyond the Napoleonic vision of legal codes that provide all
https://www.rp.pl/Opinie/310179944-Ziobro-odnawia-leki-o-polexit---komentuje-TomaszPietryga.html [https://perma.cc/73M6-7SV5].
321. Biernat & Kawczyńska, supra note 320; see also Sadurski, supra note 9, at 18
(characterizing the CT’s evolution from “paralysis” to “active collaborator.”).
322. Łukasz Woźnicki, Nowa KRS ponad prawem. Odwołań od decyzji Rady nie będzie
[Appeal against the decision of the NJC will not be heard], WYBORCZA.PL (Dec. 16, 2018, 3:36
PM),
http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24283186,nowa-krs-ponad-prawem-odwolan-od-decyzjirady-nie-bedzie.html#nowaZajawkaGlownaMT.
323. Id.
324. Ewa Siedlecka, Legalizacja KRS w Trybunale Konstytucyjnym odwołana. Ze strachu
przed polexitem? [Legalization of the National Judiciary Council in the Constitutional Tribunal
dismissed. For fear of polexit?], OKO.PRESS (Jan. 3, 2019), https://oko.press/legalizacja-krs-wtrybunale-konstytucyjnym-odwolana-ze-strachu-przed-polexitem/.
325. Id.
326. Zoll, supra note 12, at 308-09. Co-author Zoll was head of the curriculum committee
for the new school.
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answers such that judges perform only a mechanical function. 327 The
SSIP sought to shift some of judicial local control to choose one’s
colleagues and replacements to a more national system using meritbased assessments on a range of tasks over time and by multiple
assessors. The SSIP curriculum also sought to correct some
deficiencies in the entrants’ prior legal education. Such initiatives
included teaching a uniform method of legal reasoning, education in
practice-based legal ethics, and a combined first year for future judges
and prosecutors stressing a common ethos regarding values of the legal
system and the roles that legal professionals play within it.
Adding the SSIP to the judicial framework sought to shift some
power in judicial appointment from a system in which local judicial
assemblies had central power in judicial selection, performance review,
and promotion. 328 As with the design of the National Judiciary Council,
the Solidarity-led transition established strong judicial self-government
to protect the judiciary from the political branches of government by
vesting considerable power in local judicial assemblies. 329
In the original SSIP design, those going on to judicial
apprenticeships entered a fifty-four-month program in which they
alternated between study in the judiciary school in Krakow and
supervised internships in courts around the country. Both in the first
year and after, most of the curriculum in the school was active rather
than the passive lecture form common in much of Polish university
legal education. The SSIP curriculum featured interactive teaching,
hypotheticals, case analysis, research, writing, and simulation. 330 The
fifty-four-month period included multiple assessments by the various
SSIP faculty as well as judges in the field for a cumulative final
judgment of competency to graduate the best candidates.

327. Id. at 304-05; KOSAŘ, supra note 4, at 21, 36, 59-61 (expanding scope of judges’
interpretive powers generally and in Europe specifically).
328. See Zoll, supra note 12, at 303-09. In the first SSIP admission year, 589 of 1320
candidates advanced to a second stage on the results of a multiple-choice test in designated areas
of law. The top 300 candidates from the second stage exam requiring case analysis were chosen
for the initial SSIP class. As designed, only about half of that group of 300 were allowed to
progress to a judicial or prosecution apprenticeship. See also Kraśnicka, supra note 2, at 704.
329. LITYŃSKI, supra note 38, at 45 (terming the creation of the National Judiciary
Council as one of the most important aspects of the Roundtable agreement concerning
independence of the judiciary); STRZEMBOSZ & ZAKROCZYMSKI, supra note 39, at 194-95
(rationale for and history of vesting power in local judicial assemblies in December 1989
legislation).
330. Id. at 308.
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In addition to a better selection system for those who entered the
judiciary, the SSIP sought to make up for shortcomings in Polish legal
education. Students spend much of their five years achieving the
magister degree in law in large lectures on legal codes and theory of
the law, which students often are not required to attend but only to pass
the exam. 331 For many professors and law schools, examination still
heavily focuses on memorization of code sections. Many professors do
not encourage, or even permit, questions or discussion in lectures.
Students also have ćwiczenia (exercises) supplementing the lectures,
which theoretically are supposed to be practical application of the
material but often are just more explanation of the lecture. 332
As strange as it seems to an American or German, Polish law
schools do not teach a common system of legal reasoning analogous to
the American Issue-Rule-Application-Conclusion (“IRAC”) or the
German Gutachtenstil system. 333 The unpredictability of Polish case
law in similar fact patterns, and resulting difficulty in predicting
outcomes in litigated matters, may stem in large part from this lack of
unified educational standards. 334 People before Polish courts likely
often were upset by unpredictable outcomes, processes that spread over
long periods of time, and judges and courts that were not user-friendly.
It is understandable how corruption could have seemed a reasonable
explanation given Poland’s communist history where corruption was a
fact of daily life. 335

331. Kraśnicka, supra note 2, at 704.
332. Id. at 698.
333. Lutz-Christian Wolff, Structured Problem Solving: German Methodology from a
Comparative Perspective, 14 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 19, 29 (2003); Bucerius Law School, Der
Gutachtenstil (Juristische Methodik) [Legal Methodology], YOUTUBE (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wxGvEYDjQqc [https://perma.cc/UQ76-LAPK] (video
explanation prepared by Bucerius University).
334. TYMOTEUSZ ZYCH, W POSZUKIWANIU PEWNOŚCI PRAWA. PRECEDENS A
PRZEWIDYWALNOŚĆ ORZECZEŃ SĄDOWYCH W TRADYCJI PRAWA ANGLOSASKIEGO [THE
SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY IN LAW. THE PRECEDENT AND PREDICTABILITY OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS IN THE ANGLO-SAXON LAW TRADITION] (2017) (on the lack of unity of
the case law of the Polish administrative courts); Wiesława Kuberska & Paweł Sydor, Prawo,
jako targowisko opinii. Jednolitość orzecznictwa czy jego zróżnicowanie [Law as a marketplace
of meanings. Consistency of the case law or its differentiation], 19 IUSTITIA (2015) (on the
discrepancies of case law in Polish courts).
335. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (regarding the GRECO 2012 Fourth
Evaluation finding no evidence of widespread or significant corruption among Polish judges,
recognizing a gap in that likely reality and public perception, and making recommendations to
improve public trust).
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Professor Marcin Matczak makes a related argument that the post2015 capture of the Polish judicial system may be explained, not only
by the strength of the PiS government’s attack but also, by “the
weakness of the defence” provided by a legal system emphasizing
formalism and strict textual interpretation rather than holistic, systemic
evaluation of cases in light of constitutional principles and
consideration of “real life consequences.” 336 Fellow participants in the
December 2017 Fordham symposium at which this paper was first
presented, also cite as problematic a “formalist, textualist” approach
historically predominating in Central and European judiciaries, which
is different from the “more dynamic and purpose-oriented reasoning
style required by European law. 337 The previously-described emphasis
in legal education on memorization rather than argumentation and
critical assessment and lack of teaching a common form of reasoning
beyond simple text application contribute to overformalism.
In the Authors’ view, value-driven jurisprudence also must
be evaluated against the fundamental principle of justice that equal
situations must be decided in the equal ways. The Authors contend
that the problem with Polish case law is not the complete
unwillingness to consider values but rather the unpredictability in
when and how Polish courts invoke them. Sometimes a statute’s
wording is clear, and Polish courts inject values in way that
trespasses the bounds of the legitimate interpretation. As Professor
Matczak points out, in other instances, legal argument concerns only
a superficial reading of statutes or even constitutional provisions
without considering if the consequences of that interpretation are
consistent with the overall purposes of the statute, underlying
constitutional principles, or other overarching values. This lack of
coherence begins in legal education, which does not teach future
judges, lawyers, and prosecutors a common form of legal reasoning.
336. Marcin Matczak, The Strength of the Attack or the Weakness of the Defence?
Poland's Rule of Law Crisis and Legal Formalism, SSRN, 12-13 (2018), available
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3121611; MARCIN MATCZAK, THE FOUNDATION FOR LAW,
JUSTICE & SOCIETY, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: FACTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 6-7
(2018), available at https://www.fljs.org/content/poland%E2%80%99s-constitutional-crisisfacts-and-interpretations [https://perma.cc/NJA3-N2TU].
337. James E. Moliterno, Lucia Berdisová, Peter Čuroš & Ján Mazúr, Independence
Without Accountability: The Harmful Consequences of EU Policy Toward Central and
Eastern European Entrants, 42 FORDHAM INTL. L. J. 265, 290 (2018).
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The American and German common reasoning approaches
contribute to a shared form of exposition in judicial opinions and
legal argument generally. This predictable form of reasoning
renders judicial opinions more accessible to critical assessment,
predictable, and understandable to people affected by such
judgments.
By having prosecutors and judges together in the first year, the
SSIP also sought to instill a common ethos in at least these two groups
of legal professionals. Over thirty-seven visits to Poland in twenty-one
years, Co-Author Wortham has observed that judges and lawyers do
not think of themselves in the same profession in the way that
American lawyers do. American judges, of course, play quite a
different role than the lawyers in their courtrooms, but almost all US
judges were lawyers first and some return to law practice after time on
the bench.
American legal education is also quite uniform—especially the
first year. American law schools not only instill a common approach to
legal reasoning but also a common ethos about the legal system—a
system in which legal professionals play varying roles but have a
common understanding of the system. After the three-year JD and state
bar exam passage, American lawyers take jobs in varying fields, but
they do not enter multi-year apprenticeships segregated by legal
profession. Polish law students not only split off to judicial or
prosecutorial apprenticeships after the five-year university law degree
but also splinter further into three other professions: public notaries,
advocates, and legal advisors. 338 Upon completion of the
apprenticeship and passage of the bar exam, Poles are not generally
licensed as “lawyers” but rather as members of the profession in which
they apprenticed. Also much legal work done by law graduates in
government, nongovernmental organizations, or in-house for
corporations does not require a license from any of the professions, so
those “lawyers” are not part of any of the five previously-mentioned
professions. Only partly in jest, Wortham has observed, “Polish legal
professions spend so much time quarreling with each other, they cannot
present a united force in opposition to the government.” This contrasts
with the United States, in which bar associations, including the
American Bar Association, often speak out, on behalf of the single
American legal profession regarding perceived threats to judges,
338. See supra note 2.
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prosecutors, or lawyers being able to perform their roles with adequate
independence and freedom from threat or political control.
Both authors, in less stressful political times, favor more input
from other Polish legal professions and the public in the way the
judicial system functions. Co-Author Zoll’s 2012 work suggested that
greater representation for the Polish President on the National Judiciary
Council should be considered, 339 but that did not mean the twenty-one
out of twenty-five now effectively selected by the political party in
power.
Polish judicial immunity is considerably broader than the
conventional US formulation limiting it to acts done in the judicial
capacity. 340 Polish immunity extends to a general protection from
arrest, detention, and prosecution without a release from the relevant
judicial disciplinary authority. This provision also applies after a judge
has left active service. This, at first, seems jarring to an American who
assumes a judge will be treated like anyone else if the offense involved
is unrelated to judicial acts. Given the history in other countries in the
region, though, of government using criminal prosecution to target
judges—and the specter of what may happen in Poland once the PiS
“reforms” of the courts are complete—one can see the plus side of such
a broad form of immunity.
The structural shortcomings in the Polish judicial system—
beginning with inadequacies in the law schools—contributed to
conditions that likely frustrated people with matters before the courts:
unpredictable decisions, inefficiency or delay, some judges seemingly
arrogant or dismissive. It is beyond the scope of the Article to review
the reams of information assessing Polish court performance and

339. Zoll, supra note 12, at 306.
340. Article 80 ¶1 of the Law on the Ordinary Courts provides that judges cannot be
arrested or prosecuted without the permission of the disciplinary court with jurisdiction, and this
provision applies after a judge has reached retirement age and no longer is employed at the
courts. See Artykuł 80 ¶1 ustawy prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych from 27.7.2001, Dz. U.
2001, nr 98, poz. 1070 [Law on the Ordinary Courts, 80 ¶1 (July 27, 2001)]; Tekst jednolity z
dnia 14 grudnia 2018, Dz. U. 2019 poz. 52 [Consolidated text, Official Journal 2019, position
52 (Dec. 14, 2018)]. For a parallel provision for Supreme Court judges, see Artykuł 55 ¶1
ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym z dnia 8.12.2018, Dz. U. 2017 poz. 5 [Law on the Supreme Court,
Art. 48, ¶7 (December 8, 2017)]; GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 161 (describing the
Polish system and also noting they were informed of sixty-five cases where immunity was lifted
to allow prosecution between 2003-2011).
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countering PiS’s charges about the judiciary. 341 PiS’s previouslyquoted statements about their philosophy of law and justice and the
facts of their concerted campaign against the judiciary evidence that
their “good changes” are not about making the judicial system function
better or be more accountable to the public. Instead, they are aimed to
bring the courts within the government’s political control so they will
not be an obstacle to the policy ends the PiS government seeks to
achieve. 342
III. THE SOLIDARITY ROUNDTABLE NEGOTIATORS’
FORESIGHT ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Ironically, PiS’s threat to the judiciary has brought some changes
that the Authors have advocated in the past. These include greater
cooperation with other legal professions, a more accessible and open
public face by judges, and citizen education on the role of the judiciary
and the importance of judicial independence. 343 Such initiatives support
development of a vision of the judiciary’s role in a democratic system
under rule of law that is shared not only among the judges but also with
members of the other legal professions and the public.
Some of this public outreach, however, has led to disciplinary
investigations of participating judges. Amnesty International’s
December 6, 2018 report, Poland: Update on the “Reform” of the
Judiciary,” devotes about half of the text to matters pursued against
judges through the new disciplinary apparatus. 344 The Iustitia
association of Judges and the Polish Ombudsman’s office cooperated
on a “Pol and Rock” festival aiming to bring the public closer to law

341. See, e.g., supra note 157; EWA SIEDLECKA, SȨDZIOWIE MÓWIĄ: ZAMACH PIS NA
JUDGES ARE SPEAKING: THE PIS COUP AGAINST THE

WYMIAR SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI [THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM] 72-109 (2018).

342. See generally infra Subsection II.B.2 and II.C.1.
343. For an example of support from other Polish legal professions, see, e.g.,
#WeDisagree. The voice of Polish Lawyers, YOUTUBE (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dD-MCeD6Oec&amp=&sns=em [https://perma.cc/98BRUPWK].
344. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 195, at 6-9; see also AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 187, at 31-35; KOMITET OBRONY SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI
(KOS), A COUNTRY THAT PUNISHES. PRESSURE AND REPRESSION OF POLISH
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS (2019), available at http://komitetobronysprawiedliwosci.pl/
app/uploads/2019/02/pol_wersja_fin.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU2F-7EM4] (report released Feb.
15 2019 by the Committee for the Defense of Justice made up of twelve organizations including
the HFHR, Amnesty International, Iustitia, Themis, and Lex super omnia).
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with a better understanding of court work. 345 The trial simulations in
which judges participated were characterized by the disciplinary
authorities as parodies with questions raised about whether wearing a
judge’s robe and the state emblem of the judge at these events was an
“offence against the dignity of the office of judge,” and participants
were brought in for questioning. 346 In January 2019, the disciplinary
spokesperson for the common courts announced that disciplinary
procedures would not be brought against Judges Monika Frąckowiak
and Arkadiusz Krupa for their participation in the trial simulations. 347
Instead of saying such activities were not disciplinary violations, he
said the judges were not aware their actions were violations. 348 A week
later, though, the disciplinary spokesperson said that Judge Frąckowiak
would be prosecuted for her taking excessive time in a number of
proceedings. 349 Amnesty International has criticized the disciplinary
process’s apparent pattern of calling judges as witnesses, in that status
denying them right to counsel, and using that process to gather
information, e.g., three years of back judgments, to later be used in
prosecution on other grounds. 350
345. Magdalena Gałczyńska, Sądny rok dla sądów, czyli "ekscesy" rzeczników dyscypliny.
Jak i za co rządzący zamierzają karać sędziów? [Judicial year for courts, or “excesses” of
disciplinary spokespersons. How and for what do the authorities intend to punish judges?],
ONET.PL (Jan. 2, 2019, 3:07 PM) https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/sadownictwo-jakrzad-zamierza-karac-sedziow/vkq07dd [https://perma.cc/W6CN-K95Z]. Regarding the work of
the Ombudsman’s office, see supra note 124. For more information about public education
efforts by judges and lawyers’ associations at “Pol and Rock,” see Agata Szczęśniak, Co
sędziowie i adwokaci robili na Pol’and’Rock Festival Jurka Owsiaka. Ujawniamy! [What judges
and lawyers did on Jurek Owsiak's Pol'and'Rock Festival. We disclose!], OKO.PRESS (Aug. 5,
2018) https://oko.press/co-sedziowie-i-adwokaci-robili-na-polandrock-festival-jurka-owsiakaujawniamy/ [https://perma.cc/7BMF-8TNB].
346. Magdalena Gałczyńska, supra note 345; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra
note 186, at 7.
347. Łukasz Woźnicki & Ewa Ivanova, Rzecznik Ziobry nie będzie ścigać sędziów za
Pol'and'Rock [Ziobro’s spokesperson will not be prosecuting judges for Pol’ and Rock],
WYBORCZA.PL, (Jan. 11, 2019, 2:51 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24352975,rzecznikziobry-nie-bedzie-scigac-sedziow-za-pol-and-rock.html [https://perma.cc/2LW2-557M].
348. Id.
349. Mariusz Jałoszewski, Rzecznik dyscyplinarny stawia zarzuty sędziom, bo krytykowały
władzę.”Nie przestraszę się, nie zamilknę” [The disciplinary spokesperson accuses judges
because they criticized the authorities. “I am not afraid. I will not be silent.”], OKO.PRESS (Jan.
18, 2019), https://oko.press/rzecznik-dyscyplinarny-stawia-zarzuty-sedziom-bo-krytykowalywladze-nie-przestrasze-sie-nie-zamilkne/ [https://perma.cc/ZY69-TXY3] (including the judge’s
response to the charges).
350. Amnesty International Public Statement, EUR 37/9564/2018, Poland: Judges Who
Turned to EU Court of Justice Must Not Be Harassed (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR3795642018ENGLISH.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L3ZV-RJKY]; see also two Amnesty International Reports focusing on abuses
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Another controversy relates to judges’ display of the Konstytucja
graphic that now appears widely on T-shirts, banners, and stickers
throughout Poland. 351 Konstytucja is the Polish word for constitution.
In this graphic, the letters TY and JA are highlighted in contrasting
colors to stand out. Ty in Polish means you, and ja means I, hence
conveying a message of shared investment in the constitution. 352 At a
December 2018 meeting, the NJC with its recent new appointees
adopted an interpretation of the Polish Code of Ethics for Professional
Judges and Assessors saying that “public use of infographics that are
clearly identified with political parties, trade unions, as well as social
movements” would violate Article 10 of the Code stating that judges
should avoid behavior that undermines confidence in their
independence and impartiality. 353
The Amnesty International December 2018 report also says that
the activities of the new Disciplinary Prosecutor for the common courts
“raise concerns over targeting predominantly those judges who have
voiced criticism of the government’s reform of the judiciary.” 354 At
least two judges summoned for questioning were those who had made
Article 267 requests to the CJEU, raising whether the new disciplinary
procedure threatened their independence when ruling in the cases
before them in which the government was a party. 355 Another Amnesty
of the judicial disciplinary process, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 187, at 31-35, and
Update on Reform of the Judiciary, supra note 193, at 7-9; Magdalena Gałczyńska, Sądny rok
dla sądów, czyli “ekscesy” rzeczników dyscypliny. Jak i za co rządzący zamierzają karać
sędziów? [Judicial year for courts, or "excesses" of disciplinary spokespersons. How and for what do the authorities
intend to punish the judges?], ONET.PL (Jan. 2, 2019, 3:07 PM) https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-wonecie/sadownictwo-jak-rzad-zamierza-karac-sedziow/vkq07dd
[https://perma.cc/CM4GVTDD].
351. Łukasz Woźnicki, Koszulki z "Konstytucją" nie dla sędziów. Nowa KRS zakazuje
symbolu, bo jest "nacechowany politycznie" [Shirts with “Constitution” are not for judges. The
new NJC prohibits the symbol because it is “politically marked”], WYBORCZA.PL, (Dec. 13,
2018, 8:59 PM) (photograph of Łodz judges wearing the t-shifts for the 100th anniversary of
Polish independence on November 11, 2018), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24276226,koszulkiz-konstytucja-nie-dla-sedziow-nowa-krs-zakazuje.html [https://perma.cc/W6JY-PKR6].
352. Similarly, the Iustitia judges association has used an image of judges with their
mouths blacked out with the caption,” Dzisiaj my, jutro ty,” which translates to “Today us,
tomorrow you.” See IUSTITIA Polish Judges Association (@JudgesSsp), TWITTER (May 18,
2018, 9:04 AM), https://twitter.com/judgesssp/status/1042036669615140866?lang=ga.
353. See supra note 351.
354. Id.
355. Id. For other threats to judges, see Christian Davies, ‘They’re trying to break me’:
Polish judges face state-led intimidation, THE GUARDIAN (2018), https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2018/jun/19/theyre-trying-to-break-me-polish-judges-face-state-led-intimidation
[https://perma.cc/Q3CP-ECX9]; Marc Santora, supra note 99 (reports of harassment of
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International 2018 report focuses on actions taken toward judges
perceived to have treated people protesting government action too
leniently and the potential chilling effect on any judge sitting in matters
arising from a protest action. 356
As described in Part II.D, the Authors have advocated less power
in local judicial assemblies as well as initiatives like the previouslydescribed School for Judiciary and Prosecutors system, which was less
centrally reliant on existing judges regarding the education, selection,
and advancement of new entrants into the judicial track. 357 It may be,
however, that this local self-government fostered the “solidarity” that
provided mutual support in opposing illegal and unconstitutional
government initiatives despite the possible dire consequences to those
participating.
The overwhelming majority of Polish judges have resisted the
ongoing reshaping of the judiciary. So many judges boycotted running
for offices on the new, politically-controlled National Judiciary
Council that only eighteen people applied for fifteen slots. 358 Most of
the eighteen applicants were judges seconded to the Ministry of
Justice. 359 Many judges have withdrawn their applications for
promotion by the new Council, deeming it to be illegally constituted.
Iustitia has called for everyone eligible for appointment to the Supreme
Court to refrain from applying because candidacy amounts to
participation in a coup against the independent judiciary. 360 Most
judges also refused to apply for the forty-four openings announced for
the Supreme Court. 361 Some who did have been termed kamikaze
judges, meaning they applied, without expectation of being appointed
Waldemar Zurek, spokesperson for the NJC before the government’s replacement of its
members); KOS, supra note 344.
356. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 187, at 31-35.
357. See supra notes 326-330 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 125.
359. IUSTITIA and THEMIS Association statements, infra note 363; supra note 126.
360. IUSTITIA and THEMIS Association statements, infra note 363.
361. Marc Santora & Joanna Berendt, Poland’s Leader Finds an Ally in Trump, Even as
He Brings Courts to Heel, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/
17/world/europe/poland-courts.html; Griff Witte, Judge’s Boycotting Poland’s Supreme Court
Posts, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/polandsjudges-boycott-supreme-court-posts-accusing-the-government-of-a-takeoverbid/2018/08/17/8a9a5590-943a-11e8-818b-e9b7348cd87d_story.html?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.8ebc42856185 [https://perma.cc/BS92-JBTY] (130 applicants from
other legal professions and ministry officials “after the government loosened the eligibility
requirements,” many with “close ties to Law and Justice”).
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but, so that they would have standing to challenge the appointment
process. 362
Judges have organized congresses adopting resolutions against
government undertakings and legislative measures. 363 Iustitia and
Themis, organizations that together represent the majority of Polish
judges, have passed resolutions calling on the whole judicial
community to preserve judicial independence generally and, in
particular, to refuse to be a candidate for any office that is part of the
governmental campaign to suppress the judiciary. 364 Both associations
have sanctioned judges who participated in the government attack. One
of the most visible actions is Iustitia’s expulsion of Łukasz Piebiak, the
Vice-Minister of Justice, who was once a board member. 365
The legitimately-appointed Constitutional Tribunal judges have
cited the lack of the competence of the “double-judges” in dissenting

362. Łukasz Woźnicki, Nowa KRS ponad prawem. Odwołań od decyzji Rady nie będzie
[New National Judiciary Council above the law. No appeals against their decisions],
WYBORCZA.PL, (Dec. 16, 2018, 3:36 PM) http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24283186,nowa-krsponad-prawem-odwolan-od-decyzji-rady-nie-bedzie.html#nowaZajawkaGlownaMT; Poland’s
judiciary row: administrative court suspends judicial appointment, POLANDIN,
https://polandin.com/39190749/polands-judiciary-row-administrative-court-suspends-judicialappointment [https://perma.cc/BX42-9A5U]; supra note 311 and accompanying text (Polish
Supreme Administrative Court’s Article 267 referral to the CJEU of cases from such judges).
363. Statement of the Association of Polish Judges, IUSTITIA, (July 14, 2018),
https://www.iustitia.pl/en/118-information/2437-statement-of-the-association-of-polishjudges-iustitia-of-14-july-2018 [https://perma.cc/EK2B-TXFS]; Position of the Association of
Judges, THEMIS (July 22, 2018), http://themis-sedziowie.eu/aktualnosci/stanowiskostowarzyszenia-sedziow-themis-z-dnia-22-lipca-2018-roku
[https://perma.cc/9P6T-BQ2W].
Two statements were issued by the Extraordinary Congress of Polish judges after a meeting with
many voicing criticism and protest, see Resolution of the Extraordinary Congress of Polish
Judges No. 1, NAT’L COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY, http://krs.pl/pl/konferencje/nadzwyczajnykongres-sedziow/p,1/4325,uchwala-nadzwyczajnego-kongresu-sedziow-polskich-nr-1
[https://perma.cc/5JJK-HHJ9] (last visited July 31, 2018); Resolution of the Extraordinary
Congress of Polish Judges No. 2, NAT’L COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY,
http://krs.pl/pl/konferencje/nadzwyczajny-kongres-sedziow/p,1/4326,uchwalanadzwyczajnego-kongresu-sedziow-polskich-nr-2 [https://perma.cc/2857-UT4Y] (last visited
July 31, 2018).
364. Co mówią o kandydatach do Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa ich dokumenty [What the
National Judiciary Council candidates’ documents say about them], TVN24 (Feb. 18, 2018, 9:17
PM), https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/17-kandydatow-do-krajowej-radysadownictwa-co-mowia-ich-dokumenty,815776.html [https://perma.cc/WK4T-8QLN].
365. Warsaw Branch of the Iustitia Association of Polish Judges Expels Deputy Minister
of Justice Łukasz Piebiak at the Request of the Iustitia Board, IUSTITIA (Sep. 21,
2017), https://www.iustitia.pl/informacje/1893-wiceminister-lukasz-piebiak-wykluczony-ziustitii [https://perma.cc/Q6UD-D67X].
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opinions. 366 In response, the law on the Constitutional Tribunal was
amended to forbid dissenting opinions to refer to a judgment’s heading,
which includes the names of sitting judges, so the legitimacy of a
judicial appointment could not be questioned. 367 Perhaps the
legitimately-elected Constitutional Tribunal judges should have
refused to sit in panels with the “double-judges” or resigned. With new
appointments to the Supreme Court and ordinary courts, many current
judges will face similar dilemmas.
Polish journalist Ewa Siedlecka recently published a more-than600-page book detailing the history of judicial independence in Poland,
analyzing past and current complaints about judges and the judicial
system, PiS complaints about and initiatives toward the judiciary, and
the current activities in which judges are engaged. 368 The final pages
provide lists of judges who have made decisions criticized by PiS, are
active in the judicial opposition to post-2015 changes, and against
whom authorities have moved in some way. 369
In January 2017, some Polish prosecutors formed Lex super
omnia (Law above all) with the stated aim of making the Polish
prosecutor’s office operate constitutionally. 370 On January 26, 2019
100 members of the about 200-member organization attended a
meeting at which they unanimously passed a resolution calling on the
Association’s Board to assess incidents of abuse of power and
harassment of prosecutors by the management of the Prosecutor’s
Office that should be reported as crimes or disciplinary violations.371
366. See, e.g., TK: Leo Kieres dissenting to the judgment in the case of the assemblies Kp
1/17, MONITOR KONSTYTUCYJNY (Apr. 25, 2017), http://monitorkonstytucyjny.eu/archiwa/360
[https://perma.cc/FCF8-NU79].
367. Par. 54. 1 regulaminu Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 27 lipca 2017, Monitor Polski
2017 poz. 76; [Constitutional Tribunal Rules, para. 54, point 1 (July 27, 2017)].
368. Ewa Siedlecka, supra note 324; Sędziowie wolności [AKTUALIZOWANA LISTA
SIEDLECKIEJ – JUŻ 297 NAZWISK] [Judges of Freedom (Siedlecka’s list with 297 names)],
OKO.PRESS
(Dec 27, 2018),
https://oko.press/sedziow-wolnosc-lista-siedleckiej/
[https://perma.cc/KFW5-35TA].
369. Id. at 593-619.
370. O nas, STOWARZYSZENIE PROKURATORÓW, “LEX SUPER OMNIA,” http://lexso.org.
pl/o-nas/ [https://perma.cc/8SZP-QCTA] (stated aim and including difficulties presented by
Polish authorities with receiving registration including demands by the District Prosecutor in
Warsaw for their founding document and list of members)
371. Mariusz Jałoszewski & Bartosz Kocejko, Jednomyślna uchwała stowarzyszenia
prokuratorów: Ziobro musi natychmiast ustąpić, [Unanimous resolution of the prosecutors'
association: Ziobro must give way immediately], OKO.PRESS (Jan. 26, 2019),
https://oko.press/uchwala-stowarzyszenia-prokuratorow-ziobro-musi-natychmiast-ustapic/
[https://perma.cc/YR26-TZ7E].
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The resolution outlines some pertinent examples including demotion of
113 prosecutors and involuntary transfers to other cities as quasidisciplinary penalties. 372 The assembly, with one dissenting vote, also
passed a resolution calling on Minister of Justice and Prosecutor
General Ziobro to resign to halt the politicization of the Polish
prosecutors’ office. 373 In passing the resolutions, prosecutors referred
to the judges’ example, saying they will defend prosecutorial
independence as well, despite the harassment and disciplinary charges
that have already occurred and they expect to continue. 374 The head of
the Iustitia Judges’ Association attended attended the prosecutors’
meeting and called on unity among the legal professions in fighting for
the rule of law. 375
Professor Shimon Shetreet describes judicial independence as a
foundational value of a judicial system, a value that must be supported
by a culture of judicial independence. 376 This condition is usually
created through a “long and gradual process,” with the “political
leadership and the professional and legal elite” working together to
develop this culture to protect, support, and nurture judicial
independence.” 377 Poland has had less than thirty years to build such a
culture in a post-communist society. David Kosař makes a similar point
about forging a shared sense of “judicial virtue,” meaning a common
understanding among at least academics, lawyers, and judges about
what a “good judge” is. 378 Kosař contrasts the many years that
established democracies have had to create this identity with the short

372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Mariusz Jałoszewski, Prokuratorzy nie boją się dyscyplinarek i idą na zwarcie ze
Zbigniewem Ziobrą [Prosecutors are not afraid of disciplines and go against Zbigniew Ziobro],
OKO.PRESS (Jan. 26, 2019), https://oko.press/prokuratorzy-nie-boja-sie-dyscyplinarek-i-idana-zwarcie-ze-zbigniewem-ziobra/ [https://perma.cc/2N65-HAEJ].
375. Id.
376. Shetreet, supra note 3, at 17 (addressing the importance of an independent legal
profession in creating an independent judiciary in post-communist societies); id. at 18
(mentioning other important values, such as procedural fairness, efficiency, accessibility, and
public confidence in the courts).
377. Id. at 20-21 (pointing out that it took 140 years for the US Federal Judiciary to move
from administration under a cabinet department in the executive branch to its current selfjudicial governance system).
378. KOSAŘ, supra note 4, at 19, 430; Sadurski, supra note 9, at 57 (limits of structural
safeguards, young democracies’ propensity for “backsliding,” and importance of the people at
large valuing democracy).
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time since Central and Eastern European countries emerged from
communism. 379
Polish judges have taken stands that may end their careers and
possibly bring worse consequences. 380 They have had to think and talk
daily about what it means to be a judge. If the light at the end of the
tunnel appears, Polish society could emerge with a stronger culture of
judicial independence and sense of judicial “accountability-as-avirtue.” That, however, is a big “if” and one that likely would bring
with it a host of difficult legal and political problems such as those
identified in Part IV.
The Roundtable political forces, which included current PiS Party
Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński in the Solidarity group, insisted on a
strong form of judicial independence with considerable insulation of
judges from political forces. Perhaps they recognized the “long gradual
process” necessary to build a “culture of judicial independence” and
sense of “judicial virtue.” They may have anticipated the undemocratic
and authoritarian potential of Polish society (not unique to Poland),
which under specific circumstances could awakened. 381 The
Roundtable framework’s bulwarks of judicial independence at least
have delayed bringing Polish courts under political control. The judges
themselves, in cooperation with lawyers and nongovernmental
organizations, have provided much of the information necessary for
European and international organizations to issue reports and take
action. Thus far, though, it is not clear whether the dismantling of
judicial institutions can be halted and the Polish courts’ capacity to
review government action impartially without threat can be restored.

379. Id. at 428-30.
380. Supra notes 344-56 and accompanying text; Mariusz Jałoszewski, Szykują czwartą
dyscyplinarkę dla sędziego Żurka. Ofensywa na nieposłusznych [They are preparing a fourth
discipline for judge Żurek. Offensive against the disobedient], OKO.PRESS (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://oko.press/szykuja-czwarta-dyscyplinarke-dla-sedziego-zurka-ofensywa-nanieposlusznych/ [https://perma.cc/V3SV-PYHA] (disciplinary actions and possible other forms
of harassment against Waldemar Żurek, spokesperson for the now-dismissed National Judiciary
Council and one of the most vocal critics of judiciary “reform”).
381. See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 97-117
(2018) (discussing how laws, governmental structures, and constitutions alone cannot protect
democracy when important actors disregard “guardrails,” the norms and unwritten rules of
mutual tolerance and institutional forbearance, which preserve democracy).
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IV. THE FUTURE
Given the speed with which the Polish government has acted,
effective control of the judiciary may be achieved before action by the
European Union, pressure from other external forces, or electoral
change can halt the process. A future elected government, willing to
reestablish a legitimate framework of rule of law within the Polish
Constitution, European law requirements, and international norms, will
face grave legal and policy issues.
A recent Stefan Batory Foundation report considers that the three
“double judges” sitting on the Constitutional Tribunal were not
appointed lawfully, and that the selection process for the current CT
President was fatally flawed. 382 Hence, the status of cases on which the
currently constituted CT rules is uncertain. Furthermore, now Chief
Judge Przyłębska regularly changes panel compositions in a way the
report considers not to comply with the laws on the Constitutional
Tribunal. 383 The unconstitutional composition of the NJC also could be
considered to result in wrongful appointment of judges to the Supreme
and ordinary courts, which in turn would call into question the entire
judicial system’s operation and decisions in this period. 384
If opposition parties gain a governing majority, they would likely
still not achieve the two-thirds majority necessary for constitutional
change. Hence, the restoration of rule of law would have to occur
within the existing Constitution. The Constitution’s provisions,
however, do not address an emergency restoration of the rule of law;
382. STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION, ANALIZA DZIALALNOSCI ORZECZNICZEJ
TYBUNALU KONSTYTUCYJNEGO W LATACH 2014-2017 [ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
TRIBUNAL DECISION-MAKING IN 2014-2017], available at http://www.batory.org.pl/
upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Odpowiedzialne%20Panstwo/Raport%20ZEP%20o%20
funkcjonowaniu%20TK.pdf [https://perma.cc/X44A-B5UA] (showing this proves also the
dramatic drop in efficiency of the “new” Constitutional Tribunal disputing that PiS reforms are
aimed at improved functioning of the affected institutions). Co-author Zoll is a member of the
Legal Experts Group of the Batory Foundation.
383. Łukasz Wożnicki, Bunt w TK. Siedmioro sędziów: Julia Przyłębska łamie prawo
[Rebellion in the Constitutional Tribunal. Seven judges: Julia Przlębska breaks the law],
WYBORCZA.PL (Dec. 12, 2018, 3:13 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24270409,bunt-w-tksiedmioro-sedziow-julia-przylebska-lamie-prawo.html [https://perma.cc/9S6P-QEER].
384. BATORY FOUNDATION, supra note 382; Łukasz Wożnicki, Profesorowie
Strzembosz i Zoll: Decyzje nowej KRS będą nieważne [Professors Strzembosz and Zoll: New
KRS decisions will be invalid], wyborcza.pl (Mar. 7, 2018, 4:51 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/
7,75398,23113085,profesorowie-strzembosz-i-zoll-decyzje-nowej-krs-beda-niewazne.html
[https://perma.cc/DRM4-B8UC] (warning about invalidity of the newly-constituted NJC
actions); see supra note 47 regarding Professor Andrzej Zoll’s background and relationship to
co-author Fryderyk Zoll.
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its provisions on emergency situations and martial law may not match
the existing situation.
Restoring rule of law must be guided by two major principles:
wrong must be undone but proportional to the remedy needed without
causing excessive damage. Although judgments may have been
rendered within an unconstitutional, and hence illegal, framework,
people will have relied upon them. A new government could be
tempted to use a device like the PiS Supreme Court Extraordinary
Appeals Chamber to displace and revise grossly illegal judgments, but
it would be a mistake to replicate the PiS government’s
unconstitutional means to restore rule of law.
In addition to the legality questions regarding all judicial
appointments made through an illegally-constituted National Judiciary
Council, a future democratic regime will have to consider the judges
who serve in the new Chamber for Extraordinary Appeals and Public
Affairs and the Disciplinary Chamber. As described in Part II.B, the
Extraordinary Appeals Chamber has the potential to destabilize the
entire legal system by challenging final judgments from the past twenty
years. The Extraordinary Appeals and Public Affairs Chamber also has
jurisdiction over the validity of elections, the crucial last resort for
Polish democracy.
A judge’s position in that chamber alone, however, does not raise
the same moral issues as sitting in the new Disciplinary Chamber. The
Disciplinary Chamber is a potential sword hanging over all the
country’s lawyers and judges. Judges joining this Chamber, and
receiving the forty percent higher salary it brings, are in a position to
be the government’s instrument of political control.385 The Ministry of
Justice already has tried to influence the behavior of judges or
prosecutors by threatening them with the risk of the disciplinary
procedure. 386 Hence, we can be anticipate the Chamber will be used as
385. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
386. Mariusz Jałoszewski, Ziobro się nie podoba? Będą dyscyplinarki. Prokuratura ucisza
niepokornych prokuratorów [Ziobro does not like it? There will be discipline. The Prosecutor’s
office silences rebellious prosectuors], OKO.PRESS (March 29, 2017), https://oko.press/ziobrosie-podoba-beda-dyscyplinarki-uciszanie-niepokornych-prokuratorow/
[https://perma.cc
/QJ7W-X4WC]; Michał Kucyński, Minister sprawiedliwości posunął się za dleko? Zbigniew
Ziobro grozi Prof. Gersdorf [Has the Minister of Justice gone too far? Zbigniew Ziobro
threatens Professor Gersdorf], CROWD MEDIA (June 25, 2018), https://crowdmedia.pl/
minister-sprawiedliwosci-posunal-sie-za-daleko-zbigniew-ziobro-grozi-prof-gersdorf/
[https://perma.cc/XEV2-N6DK] (quoting Minister of Justice Ziobro raising the possibility of a
prosecution in the new Disciplinary Chamber for Supreme Court First President Malgorzata
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an “accountability perversion.” 387 Service in this chamber should be a
per se disqualification for future judicial office, a fundamental value of
which is judicial independence from political control.
Judges appointed through illegal procedures should not benefit
from the guarantees of prohibition on judicial removal designed to
protect judicial independence. 388 A reconstituted National Judiciary
Council would have to devise a method of individual review for judges
appointed under unconstitutional procedures. Judges who by their
allegiance to the PiS regime have violated their judiciary oath requiring
the preservation of judicial independence probably will need to be
dismissed—albeit in a process with adequate due process to hear their
defenses. Judges who have been elected to the illegal Judiciary Council
and accepted appointment should not occupy any position in the justice
system of a democratic Poland observing the principles of the rule of
law. Some judges already are suffering consequences for their
resistance. More likely will do so. A process will have to be established
to determine what is necessary to “undo” actions taken against them,
reinstate people who resigned or lost their positions, and consider
compensation for losses.
The Ministry of Justice will require major reorganization. The
practice of seconding judges to the Ministry of Justice should be
discontinued. This creates a group of judges who are too close to the
executive branch of the government and therefore potentially too
sensitive to political pressure. The Minister of Justice recruited his
appointees for presidents of the courts and new members of the
Judiciary Council from this group. 389 Although this temporary
Gersdorf for refusing to step down from her position), see supra notes 99 and 100 and
accompanying text regarding Judge Gersdorf; supra notes 344-355 and accompanying text.
387. KOSAŘ, supra note 4, at 7, 9, 13, 57, 68 (regarding how accountability mechanisms
like judicial discipline can be perverted to influence judicial decision-making through
prosecution and the threat of punishment).
388. The former PiS-Minister of Internal Affairs and Speaker of the Sejm in the 20052007 PiS government has called on all opposition Polish opposition parties to join a common
statement saying applicants for Supreme Court vacancies under the new system and participating
in other judiciary “reforms” should be removed in a future government, lose all judicial
privileges including retirement benefits, and be banned from all legal professions. Ludwik Dorn,
Opozycja musi sięgnąć po metody Kaczyńskiego. Konstytucji nie obroni w białych
Rękawiczkach, [Dorn: The opposition must reach for Kaczynski’s methods. The Constitution
cannot be defended with white gloves], GAZETA.PL (July 13, 2018, 10:28 AM),
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,161770,23668778,dorn-opozycja-musi-siegnac-pometody-kaczynskiego-konstytucji.html [https://perma.cc/D8H2-B97J]
389. Supra notes 126, 358, 359, and accompanying text.
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assignment model may work in some countries, e.g., Germany, the
Polish experience under the current situation shows it should be
abandoned for Poland, at least for the time being.
Poland’s prosecution model requires a complete reform.
Restoring the separation of the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor
General is not enough. As opposed to the majority of judges who have
resisted, many prosecutors have bent to the political purposes of the
executive branch. 390 Professionalism and professional independence
for many Polish prosecutors have evaporated. The prosecution function
is now perceived to serve the political ends of the ruling power. A
decentralization of prosecution may be necessary in order to make it
impossible in the future for the prosecution apparatus to be controlled
and directed for political ends. 391
Judgments of wrongfully composed courts should not be nullified
across the board given reliance on them. We do not have a ready answer
for what to do when an illegally-constituted court has rendered an
opinion doing an apparent injustice. Perhaps the only way to “undo”
injustice is for the state to assume liability for damages caused by the
unlawful operation of the courts.
The loss of respect for the Constitutional Tribunal is so deep that
it is difficult to envision how it can be restored. The Constitution’s
framework limits the possible range of restructuring options.
Nonetheless, only fundamentally deep reform, a kind of fresh start,
offers hope for salvation.
A post-PiS period must look carefully at the fault lines exposed in
this period of political stress and consider the judicial independence
mechanisms that were successful in at least delaying the breakdown of
institutions. 392 As raised in the Introduction, achieving an appropriate
balance between independence and accountability is difficult. One may
390. For contrary examples, see supra notes 370-375 and accompanying text.
391. See supra Part I discussing the check provided by the US federal system. Germany
also provides a check on prosecution in its federal state. See Sadurski supra note 9 (discussing
federalism as a veto point providing a check against potential “anti-constitutional,populist
backsliding”) While Poland is not a federal system, a decentralization of prosecution to lower
levels of government also could provide a check to a central authority.
392. Tomasz Ławnicki, Plan prawnej depisizacji: Nieformalny zespół już pracuje nad
tym, jak przywrócić właściwy stan prawny [Legal deprivation plan: The informal team is already
working on how to restore the proper legal status], NA:TEMAT (Dec. 7, 2017),
http://natemat.pl/224653,plan-prawnej-depisizacji-nieformalny-zespol-juz-pracuje-nad-tymjak-przywrocic-wlasciwy-stan-prawny [https://perma.cc/82EN-WCPM] (on expert groups
working on after-PiS reforms).
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argue that, from the perspective of everyday functioning, the Polish
judiciary had too much independence. As discussed in Part III, though,
the Roundtable political forces may have recognized the potential
threat to a fledgling democracy of a party with authoritarian
inclinations.
The seizure of control over the judiciary by the executive branch,
and in particular by the Ministry of Justice, will be nearly complete by
the time this Article is published. Although public pressure, EU actions
and the Polish government’s reaction to them, and the autumn’s local
and regional elections offer some hopeful signs, judicial institutions are
already largely under political control. Judicial independence will
depend on the character of individuals.
It is difficult to assess whether the citizens would have been
quicker to defend a more efficient and responsive judiciary. Poland is
not the only country seeing how effective disinformation and concerted
government attacks on the legal system and individuals can be. The
young Polish democracy was unable to develop sufficient respect for
its crucial institutions to make them impregnable. The protests in
defense of the judiciary have grown and become more widespread, but
it took considerable time for them to become established and have an
effect. The Polish example offers a cautionary tale for others: reform
the judiciary system before it is too late by enhancing not only its
quality and efficiency but also its human approach to the people facing
justice.
In Poland, a new justice system will have to be built carefully and
in a dialogue with society explaining the judiciary’s role and relevance
for the country. The light at the end of tunnel is only flickering.
Nonetheless, the democratic community in Poland must prepare for the
transition back to the rule of law. Future reform must not only undo the
demolition of the justice system but also use this experience to create a
system that better serves the needs of the society and is able to survive
political stress.

